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Foreword
The Institute’s committee on professional ethics sponsored the
National Conference on Professional Ethics in New York on October
15-17, 1967, which brought together representatives of state boards
of accountancy, state society presidents and executive secretaries, and
representatives of state society ethics committees. The conference fo
cused on attaining compliance with ethical standards.
The first session considered the reliance of the federal government
on the work by CPAs and following talks by three government offi
cials, the participants met in a number of individual discussion
groups.
At the second session an executive secretary of a state society and
state board of accountancy, and the staff assistant to the Institute’s
ethics committee and Trial Board examined the administration of
ethical codes from their respective viewpoints. Following their talks,
panelists again convened in individual discussion groups.
The third session consisted of a mock trial of a member alleged
to have violated the Institute’s Code.
At luncheon following the mock trial, Institute President Marvin
L. Stone addressed the delegates.
The fourth session was devoted to a summation of the points raised
in the discussion groups following the first two plenary sessions.
With the exception of the proceedings of the mock trial, this book
let includes the major addresses given at the conference. It includes
also as an appendix the legal opinion regarding the exchange of dis
ciplinary information requested by a delegate after the second ses
sion.
The committee on professional ethics wishes to express its sincere
appreciation to Harry F. Reiss, Jr., chairman of the conference, to
all the speakers who helped to generate discussion, to all the delegates
who attended, and to the staff who worked so hard in planning and
executing the conference.
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First Session

The Government Looks to the CPA
Fred B. Smith...

It is a special pleasure for me to participate in this conference
today because the matter of professional ethics not only falls within
the ambit of my responsibilities in the Treasury Department, but
is also a matter of special personal concern to me.
I have a few thoughts that I would like to share with you, but I
also want to take advantage of this conference, hopefully to get some
ideas from you on how to deal with some difficult problem areas that
are of mutual concern both to the Treasury Department and to prac
ticing certified public accountants and attorneys.
Let me start by laying down a few initial premises. Some 70 mil
lion taxpayers annually file income tax returns under our self-assess
ment system, not to mention many other federal tax returns. Last
year under this system we raised some $148 billion in taxes. The sys
tem is absolutely and utterly dependent upon the responsibility and
honesty of the taxpayers in this country and their professional repre
sentatives.
As you know, until the enactment of the Agency Practice Act, we
had in the Treasury a system of requiring special licenses for attor
neys, certified public accountants and others to practice before the
Treasury Department, and we had regulations which were very broad
in their scope. In effect, we made a second judgment on a certified
public accountant’s competence and personal and moral qualifications
to represent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service.
I was one of those in the government who led the fight in opposi
tion to the bill which eventually became the Agency Practice Act. We
opposed this bill solely out of our concern for the protection of the
taxpayers and for the protection of the revenue of the United States.
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Nevertheless, the act was passed, and, upon reflection, I am satisfied
that we were wrong and the Congress was right in passing that act.
I am satisfied, that is, if, as I fully hope and expect, the state
licensing authorities and the professional associations, such as yours,
now assume and proceed to carry out faithfully the responsibility
which the Congress has rightfully said is theirs, to maintain high
standards of ethics and morality amongst their membership, and to
weed out those disreputable and dishonest members who cannot be
depended upon to live up to their high professional responsibilities.
In any event, the Agency Practice Act was passed and we drastic
ally revised Treasury Department Circular 230, which constitutes the
rules governing the practice of attorneys and agents before the In
ternal Revenue Service. The special licensing or admission require
ment was, as you know, dispensed with. However, the act left in the
hands of government agencies, including the Treasury Department,
the authority to discipline attorneys, certified public accountants, and
agents practicing before the Service for misconduct.
It was clear to us from the records of the hearings and the debates
that Congress intended us to concern ourselves primarily with mat
ters of misconduct relating more or less directly to the work of the
Internal Revenue Service. Accordingly, the revised Circular 230 now
sets forth standards of conduct, the violation of which would be the
basis for suspension or disbarment, which fall principally into two
categories: (1) those which more or less directly affect the right of
taxpayers to sound representation before the Service, and (2) those
which relate to the ability of the Service to carry out its functions
and missions.
Let me give some examples of the kinds of things which might
justify disciplinary action by the Treasury. If a practitioner willfully
misrepresented facts to the Service with respect to his client’s affairs,
this would clearly be a matter of concern. Also, if he were guilty of
willful tax fraud or evasion with respect to his own personal affairs,
there would be serious doubt as to his qualifications to represent other
taxpayers.
On the other hand, a great number of things that we used to con
sider in determining whether to grant a practitioner a license, or to
discipline one admitted to practice before the Service, have now been
eliminated. Some items not found in revised Circular 230 are: im
parting to a client false information relative to the progress of a case
or other proceeding before the Internal Revenue Service; improper
retention of a fee for which no services were rendered; obtaining or
attempting to obtain money or other things of value from a client or
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other person by duress or by undue influence; endorsement of a
government check drawn to the order of the client without authority
of the client; and charging unreasonable fees.
The new provision on fees provides that the practitioner shall not
charge an “unconscionable” fee. Under our interpretation, this means
more than just charging a fee in excess of the professional associa
tion’s accepted standards. We interpret it to mean an unscrupulous
fee.
I think these examples will give you an idea of the new attitude
which we now have with respect to the discipline of practitioners, and
suggest the broad scope of the area of responsibility which we now
regard as falling upon the state licensing authorities and the profes
sional associations.
Since the enactment of the Agency Practice Act and the issuance
of our revised Circular 230, we have heard from a great number of
groups and individual practitioners, many of whom are somewhat
overwhelmed and concerned with the situation that they have helped
to create in supporting the enactment of the Agency Practice Act.
This concern is to be found in the professional organizations and is
particularly evident among those professionals who specialize in tax
practice. They realize that the “bug is now on their backs,” and they
are not entirely happy to have this responsibility. As we have dis
covered over a great many years, it is not easy to police the member
ship of a profession. Those who serve on grievance committees per
form the very delicate job of making initial judgments on the con
duct of their fellow practitioners. In addition, the proper perform
ance of this responsibility requires a great deal of time and effort on
the part of very busy men. But I want to emphasize that, in my
opinion, there are few undertakings which a professional man can
perform which are more worthwhile. In the field of taxation alone,
for example, practitioners are rendering a service which affects every
taxpayer in the country practically, and in a vital way.
The integrity of our whole tax system is heavily dependent upon
the ethical conduct of these representatives of the people. I am proud
that, in my whole adult life, I have been engaged in the practice of an
honorable profession. Although I am now in federal service, I may
choose someday to return to private practice. In either capacity, the
reputation of the profession to which I belong is a matter of great
concern to me, and I know it is also to you. I realize that a few bad
apples practicing among the legal profession can bring disrepute
upon the profession as a whole, and I am sure you feel the same way
about the practice of certified public accountancy. Both of these pro
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fessions have a very high reputation in this country today, but that
reputation must be vigilantly maintained.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and I have both been
the recipients of requests by professional associations for co-operation,
particularly in the area of making available to state licensing authori
ties and professional associations derogatory information which comes
to our attention. I can say without qualification that both of us are
anxious to be of assistance in every way possible as you assume a
greater proportion of the responsibility for maintaining the ethics
of your profession. We have given quite a bit of thought to this mat
ter, and we are engaged in studies looking toward appropriate ave
nues of assistance.
I am sorry to say that I cannot provide you with any very clear
cut conclusions at this point. Rather, as I indicated at the beginning
of my statement, I am afraid that the most I can do is bring to your
attention certain problem areas that have arisen in connection with
our current thinking on this subject.
Let me take a relatively easy one first. Every year a certain num
ber of disciplinary proceedings are initiated by the Director of Prac
tice against practitioners for violation of the rules of conduct under
Circular 230. Parenthetically, I might say that the Director of Prac
tice is completely independent of the Internal Revenue Service, and
organizationally is a part of the Office of the Secretary of the Treas
ury, operating under my general supervision. These proceedings are
brought before an independent hearing examiner pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act.
Evidence and testimony on the charges are heard and weighed by
the examiner, who ultimately produces findings of fact and an order
which may call for the disbarment or suspension from practice before
the Service of a practitioner. We regularly publish in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin the names and addresses of those who are disbarred
or suspended as a result of such proceedings. However, the published
notice does not give any details as to the nature of the violation.
Query: Can a state licensing authority or professional grievance as
sociation take action against one of those members solely on the basis
of a published notice of such a decision? It would seem to me that
they might need more than this.
At the present time, I am exploring the question of how we can
make available to appropriate bodies the findings of fact and order of
the hearing examiner in this category of cases. One avenue to be
explored is whether this can be done on the basis of requests under
the Freedom of Information Act effective July 4, 1967. I am hopeful
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that we will be able to work out a satisfactory system so that this can
be done. There are problems with doing so, particularly in regard to
professional associations, since from profession to profession and from
state to state there are great variances in what you might call the
legal standings and procedures of grievance committees. It may prove
to be appropriate in some cases to recommend amendments of parti
cular state laws to set up an adequate procedure for doing this.
There is a much broader area of adverse information which comes
to the Treasury Department where the problem of co-operation with
local authorities and professional associations is much more difficult.
Many of these cases never go to a hearing before an examiner. After
derogatory information is made known to a practitioner, he may
consent to suspension, and that is the end of it. One might suggest
that in such cases, guilt could be presumed and the adverse informa
tion and evidence which we have should also be made available to ap
propriate authorities. However, this may not be the case. A practi
tioner, in theory at least, might feel that he has such a small amount
of tax work that he really doesn’t care about being authorized to
practice before the Service, and he doesn’t want to go to the time,
effort and expense to contest the charges and produce the evidence.
In any event, there would not have been a production of all the evi
dence in a due process type of proceeding, a weighing of such evi
dence and a decision; and we have great difficulty at the moment in
seeing our way clear to make this type of information available to
local authorities under the circumstances—absent some statutory basis
for doing so. This is an area concerning which I would be very inter
ested to hear the comments and suggestions of any of those participa
ting in this conference.
Finally, in the course of its review and investigation of tax mat
ters all over the country, agents of the Internal Revenue Service may
discover some derogatory information about practitioners, but this is
derogatory information which does not relate to the matters encom
passed by Circular 230. You might say it is accidental or incidental
evidence and information which they acquire in carrying out their
regular responsibilities. This is “raw” data which has not been tested,
and we have great difficulty in seeing our way clear to making this
type of information available to professional organizations. Bear in
mind that, among other things, we are tremendously concerned not to
cause any unfair harm to any individual practitioner. We are well
aware that the disclosure of derogatory information which may ulti
mately be proved to be of absolutely no validity whatsoever can never
theless do untold damage to the reputation of the practitioner. The
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vindication almost never catches up with the publication of sensa
tional charges and, of course, to a professional man, his reputation is
his life blood.
I should like to touch on one further area which we are studying.
Under our present regulations, flagrant misconduct by a practitioner
before another agency of the federal government or, for that matter,
state and local government, is not a basis for disciplinary action by
the Treasury Department’s Director of Practice. Nevertheless, we are
well aware that an attorney or certified public accountant who files
fraudulent statements with, for example, my colleague in the Securi
ties and Exchange Commission, is certainly of dubious qualification
to represent taxpayers before the Treasury’s Internal Revenue
Service.
Of course, the initial responsibility for coping with this type of
incident lies with the other federal agency. But suppose a practi
tioner is disbarred from practice before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Some contend that this disbarment should be grounds
for disbarment by the Treasury, but this can create problems. For ex
ample, I know of a similar case not involving Treasury’s Director of
Practice, but involving a Treasury license of a different sort. In this
case, a man was denied a Treasury license on the basis of his having
been found guilty of violations of an act administered by another
department, resulting in the denial to him of certain privileges under
that department’s regulatory program. Subsequent to our action, this
person provided the other department with additional information
and evidence, and was reinstated and completely vindicated by the
other department. We were considerably embarrassed by this incident
because we had not held a proceeding in which an independent exam
iner had heard all of the evidence and come to a decision.
My tendency is to feel that while we can explore possibilities for
co-operative arrangements among the various federal departments and
agencies, essentially the task is going to devolve principally upon
the state licensing authorities and the professional associations to keep
track in the Federal Register and Internal Revenue Bulletin of deci
sions in disciplinary proceedings by the various departments and
agencies, and to take the matter from there themselves. However, I
will be very much interested to hear the views of my colleagues on the
panel or of the other participants in this meeting on this difficult
question.
These are a few rambling thoughts which I have, which I hope
may make some contribution to the deliberations at this conference.
We are very pleased that by and large our new Circular 230 has
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found favor among the various professional associations. As you
know, in the development of these regulations, we received great help
in the form of suggestions from the various associations, and in parti
cular, very thoughtful and constructive suggestions from the Ameri
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants. It goes without saying
that the Director of Practice and I, and I know the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, are always happy to discuss with representatives
of your organization and other similar organizations any problems
which may arise for you in connection with the way we carry out
our responsibilities. And, as I have said, we are tremendously inter
ested and anxious to be of whatever assistance we can in helping the
various professional associations as they move into action to tighten
up the quality and integrity of the services performed by their mem
bership.

Discussion
Mr. George Nowak: Do you have any restrictive rules with respect to
your Director of Practice ?
For example, suppose a practitioner has gotten himself into diffi
culty with a client and he’s brought up before the state board on
charges. In the meantime, he’s also having problems with Internal
Revenue Service for failure to file his own tax returns and it’s in the
process of examination at the moment.
Now the board might check with the Director of Practice. Is there
a written rule or restriction that might bid the Director to disclose
information as to the status of the practitioner ?
Mr. Smith: If I understand your question, I think you’ve hit one of
the most difficult areas that we have.
When persons are in difficulty either with our Director of Practice
or their own professional association, or with the state authorities,
under the principle that we have in this country, a man is innocent
until proved guilty. Therefore, we formally don’t take any restrictive
action with respect to that person’s ability to represent clients before
the Internal Revenue Service until there has been a completion of
whatever proceedings are pending.
Of course, the representatives of the Internal Revenue Service are
aware, frequently, of the fact that, let’s say, charges have been made
against a man and I suppose informally, they conduct themselves ac
cordingly.
One of the most sensational situations is where a man is indicted
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for bribery. When a CPA is indicated for bribery it may be two or
three years before that case comes to trial and in the meantime, he’s
representing a lot of clients before the Internal Revenue Service.
We have found no solution to that problem.
I think you have a similar problem. What do you do about taking
disciplinary action against a member of your association in similar
circumstances? Do you wait until the trial has been held, or do you
start proceedings right away ?
One of the difficulties we have in the federal government is that to
produce the evidence that we would need in the disciplinary proceed
ing might damage the criminal case, and therefore, the attorneys and
Justice Department who are handling the criminal case understand
ably want us to go slow.
This is a very difficult problem area.
Mr. A. Leon Hebert: Do you have any problems imposed by the Spivak

case, a disbarment case, here in New York where a CPA or practi
tioner might claim the Fifth Amendment in the disbarment proceed
ings themselves ?
Mr. Smith: Yes, I suppose it would be a problem. I don’t recall that
this has actually happened in any of our disbarment proceedings. I
don’t recall that it has been done, but we certainly may run into that.
I don’t know of any case. Of course, it’s like everything else—
you’ve got to get the evidence elsewhere if you can’t get it from the
man himself!
Speaker from the floor: May I ask what the position of the Bureau is

with relation to a CPA who is called upon to defend or represent an
other CPA Who’s involved in an income tax violation and proceeds
to clear the matter satisfactorily, but during the course of the engage
ment he becomes aware that his client has violated the profession’s
Code?
The CPA has a dual obligation.
First he has an obligation to his client; then, he has an obligation
to society in terms of the ethical implications involved.
The man is sort of on the barrel or on the fence. Which way does
he move ?
Mr. Smith: Well, I think that living up to his obligations to his client
with respect to privileged information would be his primary respon
sibility; that requirement in our regulations under disclosure would
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have to be adapted to conform with what his obligations were to his
client.
Does that answer your question? (Affirmative response). I think
that would be our answer.

9

Philip A. Loomis, Jr....

The Securities and Exchange Commission has had a long and
fruitful relationship with the accounting profession. Since I have
had a relatively small part in that relationship, I am particularly
glad to be here.
When the invitation came, I thought some mistake had probably
been made and you really wanted Andrew Barr, our Chief Accoun
tant, who has participated often in your deliberations and who, in
cidentally, among his other responsibilities, has primary staff respon
sibility for disciplinary matters involving accountants. However, I
was told you really meant it, and I’m glad you did.
As I listened to Fred Smith, I could note very similar problems
we have but also certain differences, both in our procedures and in
our general approach, because accountants serve different purposes
in relation to the Commission than they do in relation to the Treas
ury Department.
When Congress was considering, after the debacle of 1929, what
could be done to provide protection for the investing public, one of
the principal ideas first brought forward and embodied in the Se
curities Act of 1933 was the requirement of full and fair disclosure to
the investing public. That has been the Commission’s primary objec
tive ever since.
When the ’33 Act was pending before Congress, it was recognized
that the scheme of disclosure with respect to securities depends upon
accurate, informative and proper financial statements. It was also
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims respon
sibility for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Com
mission or of the author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.

10

Philip A. Loomis, Jr.

recognized that, unfortunately, people engaged in peddling securities,
particularly dubious securities, cannot be relied upon to provide ac
curate financial statements themselves. It was consequently proposed
that the government hire a corps of auditors who would go out and
audit the financial statements that were to be filed with the Commis
sion.
Largely for budgetary reasons, but also in recognition of the some
what inappropriate nature of such a procedure, your profession came
forward and suggested that the accounting profession would assume
responsibility for auditing financial statements to be filed with the
Commission. The Congress placed the responsibility on you by requir
ing that all financial statements filed under the Securities Act be
audited by a public accountant or certified public accountant.
They did one other thing which is interesting: Schedule “A”
of the Securities Act requires that all such financial statements be
certified by an “independent” public accountant. Congress thus
wrote into federal law the basic concept expressed in the Code of
Professional Ethics of your profession that an accountant must be
independent in his relations with his client. A great deal of the Com
mission’s concern regarding accountants has revolved around the
necessity for independence. The requirement, incidentally, was writ
ten into the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, and into the Commis
sion’s rules thereunder.
If an accountant certifies a financial statement with the Commis
sion when he is not, in fact, independent, that statement does not
comply with the law and the Commission regards the certification as
a nullity and the filing as defective.
Unlike the Treasury Department, the SEC has never had a
separate bar or licensing scheme for attorneys or for accountants
practicing before it. Rather, we allow practice to any person who is
in good standing in the jurisdiction in which he resides. Again, that
places the responsibility on the various state societies and boards. It’s
you, not us, who determine whether or not a person has the requisite
qualifications.
However, we have had, since the very beginning, a disciplinary
scheme for accountants and other professional people practicing be
fore the Commission. This is codified in the Commission’s Rules of
Practice, Rule 2-E, and I think I might read it because it isn’t too
long:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the priv
ilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person
who is found by the Commission after notice and opportunity for
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hearing in the matter (1) not to possess the requisite qualifications
to represent others, or (2) to be lacking in character or integrity,
or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.

This is pretty broad, and in practice we tend to narrow it a little.
We, like the Treasury, do not attempt to enforce all the standards
of professional conduct that you have, particularly in regard to the
relationships between the accountant and his client. We leave those
aspects of professional behavior pretty much to the states. Our con
cern is primarily with our main job, which is to get adequate and
accurate financial statements and to comply with the Congressional
requirement that accountants be independent. Consequently, we have
devoted our attention insofar as accountants are concerned primarily
to three areas. First, was the accountant independent? Secondly,
did the accountant follow generally accepted accounting principles,
at least as he understood them? And, thirdly, did he observe gener
ally accepted auditing standards? These matters relate to the quality
of financial statements that are filed with us.
The Commission has a great deal of potential authority over ac
counting which, by and large, is not directly exercised. Section 19
of the Securities Act, which grants rule-making authority to the Com
mission, deals with financial statements in very broad terms. In part,
it says:
The Commission shall have authority to prescribe the form or forms
in which required information shall be set forth, the items or details
to be shown in the Balance Sheet and Earnings Statement and the
methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts. . . .

Rather than attempting to prescribe systems of accounts or lay
down generally accepted accounting principles by rules, the Commis
sion, over the years, has co-operated with the accounting profession
in the development of those principles. Occasionally, we have nudged
you. Occasionally, you have nudged us, and I think, on balance, the
result has been the continual raising of accounting standards.
Once accounting principles are generally accepted—and I under
stand there is some controversy every now and again in this area—
the Commission expects practitioners to adhere to them. We also ex
pect practitioners to adhere to generally accepted auditing standards.
In the area of independence however the Commission has reserved
the right to establish its own standards. It has done so through issu
ance of Accounting Series Releases and opinions of the Commission.
These seem to fall into three main areas:
First, there is the question of a prophylactic rule. An accountant
for our purposes simply is not treated as independent if he has a
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financial interest in the client, or any of the client’s affiliates—even
a rather small financial interest—or if he serves the client as an offi
cer, director, or employee.
The second area with which we have been concerned involves the
accountant who, in addition to doing the audit himself or through his
employees, takes over some of the bookkeeping for the client just be
cause that would be handy. By and large, we have endeavored, in
co-operation with the profession, to discourage that. An auditor
should not sit in judgment on what he or his associates did.
Finally—and here the concept of independence tends to merge
with generally accepted accounting standards—there is the case of
the accountant who subordinates his judgment to his client and does
something that his client wants him to do, even though the accountant
himself is not wholly satisfied that this is good accounting. We regard
this in itself as evidence of lack of independence. If the accountant
falsifies a financial statement in order to get it through in the form
his client wants, we are satisfied that he is not, in fact, independent.
Thus, in our practice, the requirement of good accounting tends
to merge in a way with the requirement of independence. We say
that an accountant who is guilty of deliberate misconduct in order to
oblige a client is not independent.
We turn now from the substance to the procedure. Although we
don’t require additional licensing, we do have procedures in our Rules
of Practice for formally disciplining practitioners, be they accoun
tants or lawyers.
However, probably the most common type of Commission proceed
ing involving the propriety of the accounting treatment in a particu
lar filing is not in a disciplinary proceeding against the accountant.
At least initially, it is rather a formal administrative proceeding
provided for by statute—either an investigation or a so-called “stop
order” proceeding, or both. It is conducted in order to determine
whether a financial statement was in fact false, misleading, or de
ficient, or failed to comply with generally accepted accounting prin
ciples, or whether generally accepted auditing standards were, in
fact, observed.
If a financial statement is found deficient in any of those respects,
it will be our view that the required accountant’s certificate is false
or misleading also, unless it reveals the deficiencies in the registrant’s
accounting. The accountant, therefore, may well be in fact, if not
in theory, a sort of co-respondent in this type of case.
If we think the accountant was really culpable, such a case might
well be followed by a disciplinary proceeding against him.
As in the Treasury Department, a disciplinary proceeding against
13
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an accountant is commenced only by order of the full Commission,
and almost invariably on recommendation of our Chief Accountant.
It is heard before an independent trial examiner, under the Admin
istrative Procedure Act in the same way as any other administrative
proceeding before the Commission. Our office gets into it in that we
provide trial services.
It has been our practice for years to make the records in those
proceedings available to appropriate state authorities when they are
completed. In fact, on occasion, we volunteer them by calling the
matter to the attention of the state authorities for whatever use they
wish to make of it.
However, as in the case of the Treasury Department, sometimes
accountants do not want to fight; this is particularly true of people
who have a very limited practice before the Commission. Perhaps it’s
the first time they’re coming in and perhaps that’s why they get
into trouble. They simply don’t know the rules.
In such situations, if we conclude that the accountant is culpable
and something should be done about him, we will quite frequently
dispose of the matter either by a suspension or resignation with his
consent.
We do not reprimand. For some reason we’ve never gotten into
that business. Either we don’t do anything, or we write an opinion
(which in a way is a reprimand), and if there are mitigating cir
cumstances, let him off; or we suspend or revoke or disbar; and we
accept voluntary resignations when circumstances warrant.
When that occurs, all that is usually involved is the signing of
a short statement on which the accountant concedes the charges and
resigns from practice before the Commission, or agrees not to practice
for a specified period. This presents the same problem that Mr. Smith
was confronted with. Such information is not very useful to the state
authorities.
It doesn’t mean, however, that we don’t think the man is culpable.
There is infinite variety in these situations, but if a man who has
done a pretty bad thing which would justify his disbarment wants to
resign, we generally let him do so in order to save him and us the
time and expense of a formal proceeding. Therefore, it can’t be as
sumed that merely because a man avoids discipline by consent, he
was necessarily less culpable than a man disbarred after a formal
proceeding.
Finally, we can refer cases involving accountants to the Depart
ment of Justice for criminal prosecution. This, fortunately, occurs
very rarely, but generally I would say it would be done if we thought
that an accountant was not merely practicing, doing his work, but
14
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had conspired with his client in a scheme either to defraud or to file
false financial statements with the Commission. Of course, this
presents the same kind of problems that Mr. Smith has described:
unless and until he is convicted, there are various obstacles to either
your or our conducting a disciplinary proceeding against him.
Either we might hamper the Justice Department’s prosecution,
or the accountant might advance in our administrative proceeding
the contention that he cannot testify and defend himself in our pro
ceeding without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination in
the criminal proceeding. Consequently, as a practical matter, the
two proceedings cannot go forward at the same time. We have found
this problem a difficult one. In affirming the conviction of an accoun
tant and attorney who were acting as co-conspirators with their client
in a fraudulent stock promotion, the United States Court of Appeals
in New York highlighted the responsibilities of the accounting profes
sion when it stated that:
Tn our present complex society, the attorney’s opinion and the ac
countant’s certificate have become more lethal weapons for inflict
ing pecuniary loss than a kit of burglar’s tools.

Our formal disciplinary proceedings, unlike our other formal
administrative proceedings, are conducted privately until the hearing
examiner’s opinion comes down. This is done for the purpose of pro
tecting the reputation of a man who might be able to show he was
innocent, but means also that we have a problem in referring matters
to you until they have been finally decided.
There’s also another slight problem of liaison. We accept anyone
who is licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where he resides, but
we have to take his word for it. We can’t go checking the rosters
around the country to make sure that somebody who signs himself a
certified public accountant in fact is one. There have been two or
three cases where a fellow has signed such a certificate and it subse
quently developed that he was not licensed to practice accounting
anywhere.
On occasion, state boards have called such a situation to our at
tention if they observed it in the financial statements filed with us
and publicized in our bulletins and we welcome that species of co
operation ; otherwise we have no very good way of safeguarding our
selves against imposters.
In summary, the Commission and your profession have worked
very closely together to raise accounting standards through insistence
on adherence to proper practices and independence in the prepara
tion of the financial statements. These are the major elements of what
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has been conceded to be the world’s most successful system of investor
protection.

Discussion
Speaker from the floor: Mr. Loomis, have there been any criminal in
dictments of certified public accountants under the 1933 Act in which
the accountant was not the specific object of referral by the Commis
sion to the Department of Justice ?

Mr. Loomis: I don’t know whether you intended to limit that question
just to the ’33 Act, which I think might be a little beside the point.
I believe there have been such indictments which resulted from inves
tigations by grand juries rather than by us. On the other hand, I
don’t know of any such ease which has occurred over our objections.
Speaker from the floor: Mr. Loomis, is the SEC able to submit to a
state board or society its evidence against a practitioner who resigns
from practice without admitting his guilt?
Mr. Loomis: I would think we should be able to do that, particularly
if the state board or society requested the information.

Speaker from the floor: Mr. Loomis suggested that it would be desirable
that information concerning a voluntary resignation from practice
under the SEC could be forwarded to the state ethics committee or
state boards of accounting. How would we know that such a circum
stance occurred so that we might ask for it ?

Mr. Loomis: I believe almost invariably, if not invariably, such resig
nations are the subject of a brief announcement by the Commission,
copies of which go to the American Institute and to those people who
have asked for them.
I think maybe there was some discussion of this in one of the
group sessions, that state authorities can either establish direct con
tact with the Commission’s Chief Accountant’s office, or go through
the Institute—whichever way they wish to do it.
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We have assembled to study ways and means of maintaining the
high ethical standards established for that segment of the public ac
counting profession represented by certified public accountants. It
has been suggested that the excellent public image that the profes
sion has so laboriously established now seems on the way to becoming
slightly tarnished. If this is true, it is high time we became concerned
and exerted every effort to protect it.
I am glad to have the opportunity to share with you the experi
ence of the Rural Electrification Administration in utilizing the re
ports prepared by the public accounting profession. We have found
them most useful in carrying out our program of responsibilities.
I believe you can best understand the degree of reliance my agency
places on the high ethical and technical standards of the accounting
practitioner if I briefly outline the program objectives of the REA
and describe its use of opinion reports in meeting these objectives.
The Rural Electrification Administration is a lending agency in
the United States Department of Agriculture. It makes self-liquidat
ing loans to bring central station electric service, on a continuing
basis, to unserved persons in rural areas and to extend or improve
telephone service in rural areas. The REA was created by executive
order in 1935 and was given continuing statutory authority one year
later by passage of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936. The au
thority to make loans for the extension and improvement of rural
telephone service came in 1949 with an amendment to the Act.
These two lending programs comprise the major operating pro
grams of the Rural Electrification Administration. Electrification
loans are made primarily to co-operative associations formed solely
for the purpose of supplying electricity in rural areas; some loans are
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made to power districts and municipalities and some 1o commercial
utilities. About 60 per cent of our telephone loans are to stock com
panies and 40 per cent to co-operative associations.
Another category of loan finances the wiring of rural residences
and the acquisition and installation of electrical and plumbing appli
ances and equipment, including electrically-powered commercial ma
chinery, by power consumers. Tn no case is a loan ever made directly
to the consumer; the funds are advanced to system operators for
relending to their members. The REA’s creditor relationship thus
remains with the system operator.
Electric and telephone construction loans are self-liquidating with
in a period not to exceed 35 years, while residential wiring and ap
pliance loans are made for a shorter period. There are loans outstand
ing in every section of the continental United States, including Alaska
and Puerto Rico. Our borrowers serve more than 20 million rural
people.
The REA has made loans of $6.6 billion since the inception of the
program. Of this amount, more than $1.9 billion has been lent during
the last six years. The unpaid balance of loans outstanding at Sep
tember 30, 1967 was about $4.6 billion. Interest and principal past
due at that date was $2.5 million. Of this delinquency, $2 million in
volves a legal situation. We have had to charge off less than $50,000
since the inception of the program.
The rural electrification and telephone programs have had an ever
widening effect on the nation’s welfare. Early in the 1930’s, with the
breakthrough of rural electrification, the general public viewed this
program primarily as a provider of light to the long-darkened rural
vastness of America. Eater came the understanding of what it means
in terms of more efficient and productive farming. Now we are con
cerned with the potential for diversified economic development and
the part these programs will play in creating the rural-urban balance
required for the future of the country.
Fortunately for these basic programs, the Rural Electrification
Administration has always been staffed with people of vision and
dedication. Its mission seems to attract individuals imbued with a
strong desire to help others help themselves. REA representatives
have worked with local groups toward organization of local electric
and telephone co-operatives and have assisted small rundown stock
companies to take steps required to provide better telephone services.
In these activities the REA frequently has financed up to 100 per cent
of the cost of constructing a system, then helped many of the groups
in the operation of their system by furnishing management, account
ing and engineering assistance.
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The REA has about 900 employees, including 200 field personnel.
Its relations with borrowers are centralized in REA’s offices in Wash
ington, D.C. We have no regional or field offices. Field employees,
who work directly with borrowers, are headquartered in their homes
and report to their Washington supervisors.
In the early years, as a measure of loan security, REA auditors
periodically audited the books and records of each borrower. From
the very beginning, these auditors were interested in more than the
borrower’s financial position at a given date and operating results
for a stated period. Their stay at a borrower’s office, frequently three
or more weeks, gave them the insight into its day-to-day operating
practices as well as a basis for forming an opinion as to its financial
condition. The broad knowledge of borrower operating practices en
abled REA staff auditors to give timely assistance in many areas be
sides accounting.
After World War II, suggestions were made from time to time
that borrowers in sound financial condition could be asked to assume
responsibility for the audits of their records. In December 1947 the
REA wrote to all borrowers having a net worth equal to 25 per cent
or more of assets and having lines which had been in service five years
or more, requesting them to provide for annual audits by certified
public accountants approved by the REA. At that time 81 borrowers
qualified under the new policy and were required to provide inde
pendent audits.
The program of independent audits by certified public accountants
has expanded each year until now all electric and telephone borrowers
are required to provide independent audits, except for a few con
sidered to be potential loan security risks. Currently, 1,784 of the
total of 1,839 active borrowers have their annual audits made by
certified public accountants. They use the services of more than 500
different firms and individual practitioners. This includes around
300 firms or practitioners who do only one audit. The size of these
firms ranges from a single practitioner to members of the so-called
“Big Eight.” Through the fine co-operation of most of the certified
public accountants making the audits for REA borrowers, the entire
independent auditing program has proved very successful.
A typical mortgage agreement under which electrification and
telephone loans are made requires the borrower to furnish within 30
days after the close of each fiscal year a full and complete report of
its financial condition as of the end of such fiscal year, the report
to be certified by its treasurer and, if so requested by the REA,
audited and having an expression of opinion of an independent pub
lic accountant satisfactory to the agency. As a matter of actual prac19
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tice, the REA requires its borrowers to have their accounts and sup
porting records audited annually by independent certified public ac
countants selected by the borrower and approved by the REA. These
annual audits, together with a long-form report prepared in accor
dance with minimum standards established by the REA, are accepted
as meeting the various mortgage requirements relating to a full and
complete annual report.
The Rural Electrification Administration has consistently held to
its requirement that the auditor must be a certified public accountant.
Although there are many uncertified practitioners who are fully
qualified, the REA has no means for examining their qualifications,
whereas a certified public accountant is required to meet stateprescribed requirements and standards to receive his certificate and
is expected to maintain the standards established by his profession
in order to retain his certificate. It is expected further that he will
comply with the rules and regulations of the states in which he con
ducts audits and prepares audit reports. We place great reliance on
state boards of accountancy and state societies to see that proper
levels of ethical conduct and technical performances are maintained.
Since the certified public accountant is selected by the borrower’s
board of directors, subject to approval by the Rural Electrification
Administration, the basic relationship is between the borrower and
the auditor. As mortgage-holder, the REA requires that it be furn
ished copies of the audit reports for its information and use. If re
quested, the independent auditor’s working papers are to be made
available to the REA. For obvious reasons, the auditor must be com
pletely independent of management in the performance of his audit
ing and reporting.
The REA has provided each of its borrowers and each certified
public accountant performing audits for borrowers with a compre
hensive bulletin setting forth minimum requirements as to audit pro
cedures and expected disclosure. This policy bulletin on auditing re
quirements provides for an extensive examination of the accounts,
and requires a report that includes specified information beyond that
ordinarily furnished in the conventional long-form report. In addi
tion to the balance sheet, income and expense statement, and state
ment of margins or surplus, the independent auditor must furnish
detailed information concerning each balance sheet item, statements
relating to the condition of the accounting records, and comments
concerning his evaluation of the internal control procedures in effect.
Although very important for management purposes, a statement of
source and application of funds is not required at this time by the
REA for credit supervision.
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The auditor is expected to make every reasonable effort to elimi
nate deficiencies or furnish recommendations to the client for elimi
nating or improving existing conditions. If an irregularity in the
accounting records or practices (defalcation, fraud, or false reporting,
for example) is disclosed during the audit, the auditor is expected
to notify immediately the borrower’s board chairman and the REA.
The rather comprehensive information prescribed by the REA for
inclusion in audit reports is considered necessary because of the low
minimum equity required of its borrowers. The agency is interested
in more than an opinion on financial position, important though that
opinion is. Since changes in financial position are a matter of history,
the REA is particularly interested in operational aspects indicative
of trouble ahead which, through prompt action, may be eliminated
before becoming a matter of history.
As I indicated earlier, our program of requiring borrowers to
provide for independent audits has proved generally satisfactory.
We do, however, have some problems.
Probably the foremost of these has been the reluctance of some
public accountants to follow the minimum requirements for auditing
and reporting prescribed by the REA. Sometimes, in the interest of
keeping down costs, the borrowers themselves have limited the ex
tent of the audit or the scope of the report. In other cases, however,
the reports submitted have omitted data of importance either because
the auditor felt it was not necessary or he was not well informed as
to the requirements. Another possibility is that he was unwilling to
do the auditing necessary to enable him to make the prescribed com
ments.
Although we have no proof of this assumption, we suspect fees
have a direct impact on the quality of the work. We have found
frequently that, when fees are low, the quality of the work is poor.
We feel that the whole question of how fees are determined deserves
considerable attention by the state boards and societies.
Another problem of concern arises when the certified public ac
countant auditing the borrower’s records is unfamiliar with the
utility accounting applicable to the electric or telephone system he is
auditing. In some cases, the unique features of the corporate struc
ture of the co-operative organizations are disregarded. Although a
number of accounting firms have specialized in these audits, and have
familiarized themselves with the required auditing and reporting
standards, a few practitioners who perform audits for one or two
borrowers have not taken the trouble to become conversant with the
special standards applicable to the utility being audited. All too fre
quently independent auditors have made recommendations which
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have been in conflict with the prescribed uniform system of accounts
and recommendations of the REA.
It is of grave concern to us when certified public accountants make
recommendations contrary to the REA’s prescribed uniform system
of accounts and its published policy bulletins. It creates a problem
for the agency, for its borrower, and eventually for the accountant.
In making such recommendations, it seems the accountant has to make
a razor-edge distinction between his independence, his responsibility
to his client, and to a very much interested third party. Somehow it
doesn’t seem prudent for the accountant to be in the position of fo
menting trouble between his client and his client’s source of financing.
A final problem of importance is lack of disclosure, particularly
in cases of mortgage violations and lack of internal control. It is not
always clear whether the failure to make required disclosure is due
to an oversight or is linked to lack of independence. In common with
most lenders, the REA has written into its mortgage agreements
restrictions requiring reservation of earned surplus and limiting the
payment of dividends or patronage capital refunds until the bor
rower has attained a specified financial status. The independent audi
tor is expected to familiarize himself with the provisions of the mort
gage agreement and by his examination to determine whether they
are being observed. Likewise, many borrowers have in their bylaws
a plan for handling patronage capital which is in effect a contract
with their consumers or their subscribers. The REA is greatly con
cerned with the proper observance of these requirements and expects
the audit report it receives to provide information on any noncom
pliance. In too many instances we also find apparent reluctance to
disclose weakness in internal control, particularly as it relates to the
handling of travel and miscellaneous expenses of the management
and board of directors.
This disclosure problem brings into focus a very serious issue—
which might not be limited to reports filed with us. There seems to
be a lack of feeling of real responsibility to third parties on the part
of too many public accountants. Occasionally, through some channel
other than the audit report, the REA finds that a borrower has vio
lated the provision of its mortgage or bylaws, or both. In a few cases,
borrowers have used subterfuge, such as the payment of unreason
able salaries or bonuses to officers or owners, in order to bypass divi
dend restrictions. When these and similar violations are not disclosed
in the audit report, the accountant is not complying with the spirit
of his professional standards requiring full and complete disclosure
to third parties. This is particularly serious when, as in our case, the
third party is readily identifiable and its interests are, or should be,
known to the auditor.
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In the interest of overcoming deficiencies which mar an otherwise
excellent program, the REA endeavors to work with its borrowers
and the accounting profession to improve the quality and reliability
of audit reports. It has a small staff in Washington reviewing all
audit reports received, to ascertain that each audit report substan
tially meets the requirements set forth in REA policy bulletins.
Where it is pertinent, the borrower and the certifying accountant
are advised of reporting deficiencies and suggestions are made for
improving future audit reports.
This office review is supplemented by an evaluation at a later
date by REA field accountants. Our field accountants, in connection
with their periodic examination of borrowers’ records to ascertain
that loan funds have been used for the purposes for which the loan
was made and to observe any practices contrary to program objec
tives, are asked to comment on such matters as:

1. Are the independent auditor’s statements about internal control
factual?
2. Are recommendations to the borrower consistent with Rural Elec
trification Administration policy and procedures ?
3. Were any major violations of the mortgage or loan agreement ob
served which were not disclosed in the audit report?
4. Did the scanning of the books of original entry reveal any basic
accounting errors which were not disclosed by the independent
auditor?
5. Were the independent auditor’s statements relative to plant ac
counting factual and complete?
6. Were errors or omissions noted which would have changed the fi
nancial statements or the audit report to a substantial degree?
We recognize this review is not comprehensive and lacks depth.
The REA purposely avoids duplicating the work of the independent
auditor and does not audit behind him, but the answers to these ques
tions do touch on key points and provide some basis for evaluating
the quality of the work being performed.
In selected cases, the working papers of the public accountant
are examined. This is the only way we can determine whether a
proper audit has been performed or not. We have been disappointed
in many of the papers reviewed. However, we believe that most prac
titioners have a sincere desire to improve their work and, through a
cooperative approach to this matter, progress is being made.
If substandard auditing is indicated, the agency may revoke its
approval of the certified public accountant to perform further audits
for any of its borrowers. Or it may, if the circumstances seem to
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justify some leniency, place the auditor on probation and subject his
reports and working papers to close scrutiny for a period of time.
If, at the end of the probationary period, the REA is satisfied that
the audit performance meets acceptable standards, including all of
the agency’s prescribed requirements, full approval is restored. If
not, the REA has no choice but to revoke approval for any further
audits of borrowers’ records.
I have briefly outlined the experience of my agency in utilizing
the reports of certified public accountants and the great degree of
reliance we place on the high ethical and technical standards of the
accounting profession.
I have also briefly discussed the remedies we have for sub-standard
work. In the final analysis, however, the real responsibility for main
taining standards is yours. So far as I know, we are the only federal
agency which has pegged its reporting standards at the certified
public accountant level. We have been able to do this only on the
premise that high technical and ethical standards are guaranteed by
vigorous state boards of accountancy and equally zealous state and
national organizations. Don’t let us down!
In conclusion, let me say again, that the REA is generally well
pleased with its program of reliance on independent audits in its
administrative process. Clearly much of the success of the program
is the result of the generally high qualities characteristic of the par
ticipating certified public accountants. In the main, they have been
co-operative, interested in the objectives and progress of the program,
and anxious to do a good job. Furthermore, since the program’s
inception, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
has recognized our audit program’s importance to the accounting
profession and has actively cooperated with the REA in making it
a success. The Institute’s committee on relations with the federal gov
ernment and the Institute’s Washington division have been especially
helpful. We are looking forward to this kind of continuing co-opera
tion. We would like to establish an equally successful working
arrangement with state organizations.

Discussion
Speaker from the floor: Mr. Surginer, you mentioned that your agency

would like to refer disciplinary matters to the professional organiza
tions for resolution rather than have them go through a full trial.
How would you expect such a system to work, and aren’t there
legal problems involved ?
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Mr. Surginer: When the problem is ignorance of required standards,

I would prefer that we not go all the way to a disciplinary trial.
I would rather work with the state boards in an educational frame
work and have some sort of discussion with the individual concerned.
I think this would provide a mutual assistance to the practitioner.
It would certainly help us and benefit the public.
Speaker from the floor: Mr. Surginer, do you expect the borrower’s

auditor to inform the REA when he feels salaries are too high? Isn’t
this an improper burden to place on the CPA ?
Mr. Surginer: What I have in mind is that the known documents pro

vide, under certain circumstances, that the increase in salaries or any
salary adjustments will be approved by the REA and what I have
reference to here is disclosure of the fact when salaries have been
increased contrary to that mortgage or loan provision.
In other words, I would not expect you to pass judgment on the
propriety of the salary level. It’s only the matter of the violation of
the loan agreement.
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I wish that I could offer some profound observations and some
really down-to-earth solutions for obtaining compliance at the state
level through the machinery of the state board and the state society.
Because some of today’s problems had their origin a number of years
ago, let’s make just a brief estimate of the situation.
Whether characterized as rules of professional conduct or codes
of ethics, we ’re talking about guidelines of conduct voluntarily
accepted by those entering the public accounting profession. The
codes define conduct which will maintain high standards of technical
competence, morality and integrity in the public interest.
I believe that it’s an accepted fact that a code of ethics is one of
the keystones of a professional person, equal in importance to formal
education, demonstrated competence and public service.
But for many years a written code of ethics was not a part of
public accounting. Only in very recent years has substantial nation
wide uniformity in this area been established.
The first record I could find of a code of ethics being adopted was
in the 1919 Yearbook of the American Institute. There were eleven
or twelve rules. At that time, as you all know, there were very few
certified public accountants in the United States.
I’m not familiar with the situation in other states, but in Ken
tucky the board of directors of the Kentucky society considered a
code of ethics as early as 1936—and when I say early, that may seem
early in the profession but it has been relatively recent. They did
not adopt such a code at that time, but continued to function under
the American Institute’s Code until 1948 when they adopted their
own. In 1946, immediately after the passage of Kentucky’s first reg
ulatory public accounting law, the Kentucky State Board of Accoun
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tancy adopted almost word for word the American Institute’s Code.
This means that quite a number of CPAs in practice today entered
the profession in Kentucky at a time when there were no codes of
ethics governing their practice. And I’m sure this would be true in
most other states.
I think that we can reasonably assume that those CPAs who were
members of the American Institute or of a state society having a
code may have been aware of the provisions of the code on entering
the profession. However, I seriously doubt that very many have
made an effort to study their complete significance or to keep abreast
of subsequent changes. In addition, we should realize that there are
today in the United States a number of CPAs who are not members
of either a state society or the American Institute. These fall in a
category of the “unreached” since they receive little or no com
munication from a professional organization of certified public
accountants.
This latter group, of course, must be considered the sole respon
sibility of the licensing board.
As I see it, we in professional organizations who are concerned
with compliance inherit the other segment of the profession, the
“unconcerned” or “uninformed” or both.
Where do we stand today ?
Since public interest is the basis for state laws licensing the public
accounting profession, most of the state accountancy laws provide
for state boards to promulgate rules of professional conduct. Accord
ing to the latest tabulation from Commerce Clearing House, all but
six states and the District of Columbia now have codes of ethics as
a part of their regulations. These six states are Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland and New Hampshire.
The AICPA Code, state society codes and those boards having
rules of professional conduct are almost uniform throughout the
United States and uniformity is a big step forward in that it
eliminates state lines and promotes co-operative efforts in enforcement.
In my opinion, no CPA would want to be in public practice with
out rules governing his relationships with clients, colleagues and the
public. If this observation is correct, then why do state societies and
state boards have problems with compliance? There are two principal
reasons: first, a lack of knowledge and understanding of the rules,
and second, a lack of diligent enforcement.
Let’s consider the first reason for a moment. There are no training
courses concerned specifically with professional ethics. With the
exception of areas touched upon in auditing courses in college, CPAs
must gain their knowledge and understanding through the dissemina
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tion of information by a professional organization or by the state
board of accountancy.
Those of us who are concerned with state society publications
must assume some of the blame for failing to disseminate enough
information on ethical matters. Of course, we can never be sure of
our readership, but at least we could give the exposure that is needed.
For example, I’m sure most of you recall the article in the June
’67 issue of The CPA, the Institute’s membership bulletin, announc
ing that a member had been expelled from membership in the Ameri
can Institute for publication of a card in a newspaper in the Bahamas.
We wonder why this individual would not have known that this was
a violation of the code of ethics and yet, about twice a year, I
receive telephone calls from members of the Kentucky society who
are planning to open an office or even relocate offices and they want
to know what size card they can put in the paper!
To publish this type of disciplinary information certainly gets
the problem across to members who read it and if there were any
who were unaware of the rule against publication of a card, they
should no longer be in doubt.
Unlike the Institute’s CPA bulletin, which goes only to members,
state society publications have a distribution to many outside the
profession. This raises a question as to the advisability of publishing
details of disciplinary actions in any publication going to the general
public.
After preparing this talk, I looked through the clippings that
came in through our clipping service and what did I find but an
announcement or a card which had appeared in the paper in the
Louisville area. I was amazed to find that we’re not getting across
to our members the fact that the card has been prohibited for a
number of years. I just don’t know how we can reach members who
won’t read what is sent to them.
During the planning stages of this conference, the American
Institute requested of state societies and state boards information
on disciplinary action taken during the period of January 1, 1962
to July 1, 1966.
Kentucky responded to this request and submitted forty instances
of violations handled by the state board and twenty-one handled by
the society. None of these disciplinary matters were publicized in
any release to the membership or to the registrants of the state
boards. I’m glad to say that most of these violations concern pro
fessional behavior rather than technical standards.
The Kentucky board is now studying the matter of releasing its
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enforcement activities without the use of names, except in cases of
revocation of certificate. This would be a means of indirectly edu
cating members of the profession in ethical matters.
Progress is being made in education in ethics, both by state
boards and state societies. A growing number of state boards of
accountancy require examinations in ethics before the issuance of a
certificate. In that connection, the National Association of State
Boards of Accountancy supplies questions on ethics from their stock
pile for the use of state boards. With some twenty state boards giving
their own ethics exams, the Board of Examiners of the American
Institute now limits ethics questions on the CPA examination to those
affecting auditing and reporting standards as distinguished from
ethical behavior.
More and more state societies are publishing codes of ethics in
their membership directories and other publications. Some few, from
time to time, publish interpretative opinions in their bulletins and
some state societies are trying to make effective the AICPA proposed
program of practice review. In addition to these, the AICPA staff
training program has a session on ethics and some firms—and I
hope there are many—hold staff sessions on ethical standards. These
are several of the avenues by which members of the profession be
come knowledgeable in the area of ethics.
A thorough knowledge and understanding of the code provisions
should be a primary goal of state societies and state boards.
Now, let’s look at the other reason creating a problem in com
pliance—lack of diligent enforcement. Who is at fault? State society
ethics committee? Trial Board? State board? Members? Certainly
all are to blame to a certain extent.
Diligent enforcement requires first of all that members be aware
of what constitutes a violation and, second, that they be willing to
report to the proper authority. Diligent enforcement also connotes
prompt action, and problems arise in this area. Unfortunately, mem
bers are reluctant to assist in this policing activity.
Ethics committees of state societies too often are slow to act.
State boards meet infrequently and their formal hearings require
detailed arrangements. And there’s a hesitancy to publicize viola
tions of members.
When we talk of members’ reporting violations, I’m sure that
many of you, particularly those concerned with state board activities
and society management, receive the same verbal complaints that I
received with regularity. These are oral reports of violations of tech
nical standards from a CPA who follows another on an audit. Others
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call to report that some firm or individual has solicited one or more
of his clients.
Are these members willing to register a formal complaint in
writing and where necessary, submit documentary evidence? No! In
the first instance, the client would have to be brought into it and
would become involved and that would not be good for client rela
tions. Also, the CPA who preceded him on the job would be pretty
sure where the complaint came from and this, it is felt, would not be
good for professional relations. In the second instance, the CPA who
is charged with solicitation usually has been unable to take the
client, so in the complainant’s reasoning, no damage has been done.
No formal complaints are filed. In each instance, they are just
passing along the information to me so I can drop a note in the file
for future reference. Are these members at fault for not filing a
formal complaint?
I would have to agree with the remarks that John Lawler made
in his report to Council in Portland when he said:
The CPA who refrains from disclosing the misconduct of another
CPA, particularly when that misconduct could now or later ad
versely affect the interest of others, might well be considered to
share in the guilt of the errant member. As a matter of fact, he
might be even more guilty, for some of the undetected sins of
omission or commission may be products of ignorance rather than
of design and will be repeated if not promptly discovered, to the
injury of the public welfare, the offender’s reputation and the
profession’s prestige.

Overcoming this reluctance is going to take time. Ethics commit
tees, by prompt action on reported violations, can help remove this
reluctance.
I know of instances where violations have been reported and
because of the delay in investigation and failure to take action, the
CPA who reported the violation came to the conclusion that it did no
good to report violations since it appeared that nobody would do
anything about it. This problem can be removed by proper selection
of ethics committees and speedy handling of alleged violations.
There is, too, the problem facing state boards of accountancy who
meet infrequently and whose hearings require detailed arrangements.
At the present time, very few state boards have the personnel required
to make investigations of complaints for the simple reason that funds
are not available.
Many accountancy laws did not envision all the administrative
functions that have fallen to state boards. Very often, to obtain these
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funds, the boards must petition the legislature in their respective
states. This can be changed but it will not be done until state boards
recognize their responsibility and seek to provide the funds necessary
for enforcement.
From the comments I’ve made thus far, you might get the im
pression that I do not believe that progress is being made in enforce
ment. This is not so. In the twelve years that I have served the state
board and the Kentucky society, I have witnessed a great deal of
progress, not just in Kentucky but in other states. State societies are
focusing greater attention on prompt and fair enforcement and state
boards of accountancy are focusing on the educational aspects, as
well as enforcement.
While I know that we in Kentucky are not doing everything we
should, some of you may be able to profit from the preventive steps
we are taking.
First, the State Board of Accountancy requires an examination
on the code of ethics as a basic part of every application for exam
ination or certificate by waiver. This is an open book examination
and all examinations are graded. Any incorrect answer is called to
the applicant’s attention by letter.
Second, all successful candidates are required to attend a briefing
session on ethics with the State Board of Accountancy and members
of the society’s ethics committee. This session is held on the day that
the new CPAs are to receive their certificates. During the briefing
session, they are presented with a copy of the AICPA publication,
Ethical Standards of the Accounting Profession.
The most common violations coming to the attention of the board
and several of the numbered Opinions and informal opinions are
referred to and discussed. In Kentucky, the candidate has to have
completed the experience requirement before he sits for the examina
tion. This makes it possible to discuss practical applications of the
rules which might be difficult in states which issue the certificate
before experience is completed.
We urge all new CPAs when in doubt about possible ethical con
siderations of any contemplated act to call the state board or society
office and seek advice before possibly committing a violation. We also
urge them to report any violations that come to their attention and
we place the responsibility for assisting in the policing of the pro
fession squarely upon the new CPA. We assure them that the source
of the complaint will not be revealed unless subsequent events prove
that he must be brought into it.
Third, every person receiving a certificate is required to take the
oath of a CPA in which he swears to abide by the rules of profes
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sional conduct and sign his name in the oath book. We also subscribe
to a clipping service. This has proved to be a source of information
on violations by members of the profession.
We require that all complaints of violations be in writing. If the
alleged violator is a member of the Kentucky society, the ethics com
mittee receives the complaint immediately. If he is not a member of
the state society, the state board investigates and disposes of the
matter.
When, in the opinion of the Society’s ethics committee, the matter
is serious enough, its findings are turned over to the state board.
The matter is then disposed of in either an informal or a formal
hearing. I might add that the American Institute is also informed.
You will recall that President Giffen last February urged the
exchange of information on ethical matters between the American
Institute and state societies and state boards.
The Kentucky board immediately requested an opinion from the
Attorney General, who ruled as follows:
Judgments of the board as to violations of the code of ethics,
reached after investigation and hearing, are not confidential but
represent a public record of a state agency acting in the public
interest. There is no reason why findings of the board that licensees
have violated the code of ethics should be withheld from such inter
ested organizations as the Kentucky Society of CPAs or the Ameri
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Release of informa
tion as to violations could, in fact, have a salutory effect upon the
profession.

Enforcement is not a simple task, nor a pleasant one. No society
ethics committee and no state board relishes sitting in judgment on
a fellow practitioner for a violation of the rules of professional con
duct, but it must be done. And it goes without saying that no CPA
wants to be called before a society ethics committee and certainly
not before the state board for any reason.
To promote compliance, we must reduce the incidence of viola
tions. To accomplish this, we must rely upon education, examination
and information.
First, we must educate through ethics courses in colleges of
accounting, and I mean a more specific course than is now given by
professors in auditing courses; through staff training courses, both
formal and informal; by precept and example of senior members of
the profession; through written examinations on ethics before the
issuance of a certificate; by informative programs at state society
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annual meetings and chapter meetings; and by information releases
through state society publications and state board bulletins.
Second, by diligent enforcement through a society ethics commit
tee of seasoned members whose integrity and professional standing
is unquestioned; by encouraging members to help police the profes
sion by reporting violations, even minor ones and doing so promptly;
by handling complaints promptly and by publicizing the activities
of the committee in newsletters or special bulletins to members, we
can also reduce the incidence of violations.
One of the goals of this conference is to determine how to obtain
compliance with the provisions of the code of ethics. I hope that my
remarks may prove helpful to some of you in reaching this goal.

Discussion
Mr. George Nowak: I wonder if Mr. Caldwell would elaborate a little

further on the ethics examination. When do they give it? How long?
Who grades the exams ?
Mr. Caldwell: The ethics examination is a series of questions requiring

the applicant to review the entire code of ethics in order to be able
to answer the questions properly.
The examination must be in his own handwriting on a prescribed
type of paper. It is submitted at the time that the application is sub
mitted and I review the answers and then submit the examination
together with the rest of the application to the members of the board.
If there are any comments on the answers that may be given on
the examination and it’s necessary to call it to the attention of the
applicant, then I’m the one who usually writes the letter.
There are fifty questions on the particular examination that we
give. Of course, the examination is revised from time to time. It’s
given ninety days before the month of the CPA exam.
Speaker from the floor: Willard Bowen who was in charge of the com
mittee which set up the exams for the Association of State Boards of
Accountancy is here.
Chairman Reiss: Would you like to add something to what Mr. Cald

well said ?
Mr. Willard Bowen: The recommendations of the National Association
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of State Boards of Accountancy can be obtained by every state
just by writing to the National Association of State Boards of
Accountancy.
Our committee has set out a complete set of recommendations for
giving these examinations and we have a committee on examinations
sending out a set of questions and answers, at least once a year, for
the use of all the state boards. Open book ethics examinations are
readily available to any state board and I highly recommend that the
boards who don’t have them now consider adopting them.
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When we talk about administration of a Code of Professional
Ethics from a national point of view, three questions seem par
ticularly deserving of our consideration :
First, is there sufficient awareness of professional ethics and
concern for its enforcement among practitioners ?
Second, is there adequate machinery for enforcement at the state
board, state society and Institute levels ?
Third, is there adequate exchange of information regarding dis
ciplinary matters among all of these interested jurisdictions?
Let’s look at the last problem first, the exchange of information
regarding disciplinary matters.
In February of this year, Institute President Hilliard Giffen
wrote to all state boards of accountancy and CPA societies express
ing his concern over the status of the profession’s disciplinary efforts.
There has been a growing concern about this among Institute presi
dents in the recent past, and the issuance last year of the new Trea
sury Circular 230 served to bring things to a head.
As you know, the Internal Revenue Service has abandoned a very
large part of its disciplinary effort as far as CPAs and lawyers are
concerned. Gone is the Treasury card and gone is the agency’s right
to revoke or suspend it. The sole criteria for practice by CPAs before
the IRS now is possession of a valid CPA certificate.
This appears wholly reasonable. If the accounting profession is
self-disciplining, there is really no need for the federal government
to perform a duplicating disciplinary role.
One reason for the Treasury’s willingness to restrict its disciplin
ary activities may well have been the inherent difficulty in policing
the activities of all Treasury card holders by a single agency. The

35

Attaining Compliance with Ethical Standards

decentralization of responsibility to the state level therefore seems a
very good thing for all concerned. However, those who are familiar
with the disciplinary activities of state boards and societies and of
the Institute may well ask if the profession is prepared to accept
this challenge.
One indication that it may not be is the lack of uniformity in
codes of ethics, but this is less of a problem as time goes on and
codes become more uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Another indication is the difference in interpretation of similar
rules by different bodies and the disparity in penalties meted out by
various disciplinary authorities for similar offenses. As an example,
the Institute is informed that some of its members who have been
expelled by the Institute after having been convicted of felonies,
have retained their CPA certificates in full force and effect. It could
be argued that this results from local considerations.
At one time, it may have been a matter of only local concern
when a state board restricted the right of a person convicted of a
serious crime to practice as a CPA. Under the old Circular 230, the
status of the CPA certificate was probably of minor concern to the
Treasury when it could fulfill its public trust by revoking the prac
titioner’s Treasury card. But the situation is completely different now
that a person can practice before the IRS simply by showing that he
has a valid CPA certificate.
The almost total reliance of the Treasury Department on the
integrity of the CPA certificate places a heavy responsibility on state
boards to enforce standards of conduct and discipline CPAs who
violate ethical standards or who are convicted of serious crimes. And
as Les Surginer pointed out this morning, the same principle applies
to agencies which, like the REA, accept the CPA certificate as qualify
ing a person to practice before them.
But it has been truly said that we do not improve the ethics of
the profession by drumming out convicts. A person who has been
convicted of a serious crime is probably the easiest to discipline be
cause the courts and usually a jury have found that his behavior has
fallen below the standards set by society. Tn a sense, someone else
has made up our minds for us.
The case of the practitioner who appears to have performed sub
standard work presents the profession with a far more difficult, but
infinitely more significant problem. First, was he simply negligent, or
has his practice been characterized by substandard work? If the
latter, is it because he is basically a bad operator, or is it simply that
he’s ignorant of the profession’s high standards of competence? If he
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does not know the technical standards, are our educational efforts
and standards to measure minimum competence through the uniform
CPA exam adequate ?
And if we’re sure that the practitioner entering the profession
has adequately proved his basic competence through the exam, why
did he later lose contact with the technical standards? Is the profes
sion’s program for continuing education adequate in this regard?
Have we failed in our obligation to encourage and perhaps even force
him to maintain his proficiency ?
These are questions which should and must be considered in any
matter coming before an ethics committee or Trial Board dealing
with technical noncompliance.
We must analyze how we should deal with his failures. Does a
suspension from practice as a CPA or from membership in a pro
fessional society for failure to observe technical standards carry with
it the obligation that before the suspension is lifted, the member
must prove to the satisfaction of the disciplining agency that he
understands his technical deficiencies and has educated himself so
that the offense will not happen again ? Is such a procedure practical
or desirable ?
Until we reach the utopia of a single disciplining authority, any
disciplinary authority should be able to feel that the integrity of its
decisions will be respected to the extent that action by one such
authority will cause the other authorities to initiate an investigation.
For example, the SEC should be able to feel confident that all
professional bodies regularly review accounting series releases, so
that when it is shown that a practitioner has failed to comply with
accounting standards, the boards and societies concerned will initiate
an investigation which might lead to disciplinary action by those
groups.
In some cases, the SEC will accept a resignation from practice
in lieu of a formal hearing before the Commission and will publish
its findings. Often these releases suggest to a reader that the profes
sion’s technical standards have not been observed by the party con
cerned. While the Commission’s powers end with acceptance of the
resignation, surely its interests do not.
It publishes its findings to protect the public. And to assure that
the public is fully protected, the boards and professional societies
would seem to be obligated to investigate to see if the substandard
practice before the SEC warrants further action on their part.
This is not to say that there can or should be complete uniformity
in ethics enforcement or that a member who has been suspended from
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the Institute or from a society for, say, two years should necessarily
suffer a like suspension of his certificate.
Different values, different considerations, different responsibilities
and different legal considerations of the various organizations come
into play. But what I do mean to suggest most strongly is that when
a person is disciplined by any disciplining body, that action is of
concern to all other such interested bodies and they should investigate
the underlying causes and take whatever action they deem appro
priate. They just can’t continue to ignore each other’s work.
President Giffen expressed the feeling that one way to assure
compliance was to exchange disciplinary information among the inter
ested organizations on a formal routine basis. To that end, he pledged
that the Institute would notify state societies and boards of any
disciplinary action taken against their members and registrants and
asked that the societies and boards do the same with respect to actions
involving Institute members.
This pledge was predicated on the advice of Institute’s legal
counsel that there was a minimum danger of libel action being suc
cessfully prosecuted against the Institute as a result of its good faith
disclosure of information regarding Trial Board decisions to parties
having a legitimate interest in such actions.
The legal counsel of some state societies take a more restrictive
view. Some say that specific bylaw authorization is necessary for
even this limited exchange of information regarding decisions in
disciplinary hearings. Others permit a full exchange of all informa
tion pertaining to the case so long as the bylaws specifically au
thorize it.
The factors influencing these restrictive opinions are easy to under
stand. Counsel’s job is to keep his client out of legal difficulties. The
more conservative the opinion, the less danger there is that the client
might be sued.
However, we should concern ourselves with the broader challenge
imposed on the profession as guardians of the public trust. Granted,
we should avoid lawsuits, but in doing so, need we take the easiest
or safest road? In view of our responsibilities to the public and the
profession as a whole, rather than to ask legal counsel, ‘‘The Insti
tute wants to know why we expelled one of their members from the
Society. Can we tell them anything?” should not our question be,
“How far can we go in exchanging information with other profes
sional bodies having a legitimate interest before incurring a material
risk of suit ? ’ ’
The Illinois society action could be taken as a model. In response
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to President Giffen’s letter, the following bylaw was adopted:
The officers, directors and employees of the society are authorized
to obtain information from and to provide information to the
officers, counsel and employees of the American Institute of Cer
tified Public Accountants on matters of mutual interest, including
information concerning members of the society and applicants for
membership in the society. If information concerning a member or
an applicant for membership is furnished by the society to the
Institute, it will be provided only upon receipt of a written request
for such information from the Institute.

I am quite sure that the Illinois society would feel flattered to
have its language appropriated by any organization represented here
today. It offers an effective and a practical way of doing what needs
to be done.
Assuming steps are taken to meet any reservations of legal counsel
concerning the exchange of information, at what stage should infor
mation be exchanged ?
It usually takes the Institute from six months to a year for a
complaint to be investigated by the ethics committee and subsequently
be determined by the Trial Board. After such a determination is
made, it seems quite clear that there is little risk in our notifying
interested state societies and boards of the suspension or expulsion
from the Institute of one of their members or registrants, and Bill
Caldwell reported in his talk that this is basically the position taken
by the Kentucky Attorney General. But since it takes so long for an
erring member to be disciplined, consideration should be given to
exploring whether information can reasonably be exchanged at an
earlier stage. This would be desirable for several reasons.
The basic purpose of any disciplinary action is to protect the
public by penalizing unscrupulous or substandard practitioners. To
fulfill this trust, a hearing of the charges should be had at the earliest
possible time so that if found guilty, the practitioner may be appro
priately penalized. This principle applies equally to each of the pro
fessional organizations. In addition, every effort should be made to
resolve the issues as soon as possible so that the respondent is not
subject to the anxiety of the disciplinary process for a longer time
than is necessary.
We should consider, therefore, whether we can move forward the
point of time at which disciplinary information is exchanged. For ex
ample, would it be practical or desirable for the Institute to notify a
society or board of the nature of a complaint concerning a member or
registrant? If a member is alleged to have been convicted of a felony
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and the ethics committee has court documents proving the conviction,
it would seem reasonable to exchange the information as soon as it is
received and this would, at all times, be while the matter was still
under investigation and prior to the time that it is referred to the
Trial Board.
If the complaint concerns substandard work, different considera
tions come into play. In the conviction cases, a determination of guilt
has already been made by the courts. With complaints involving sub
standard practice, the initial determination of whether there are, in
fact, any grounds for the charge must be made by the ethics commit
tee itself, which is charged with investigating complaints.
A few months ago, we asked counsel for the Institute to consider
whether it would be legally possible as a part of the committee’s
routine investigation, to notify a state board and society concerned
that a complaint had been received, set out the substance of the com
plaint and ask whether the other bodies had any information which
would be of assistance to the committee in its investigation. This
procedure would seem to have several advantages.
First, all agencies concerned would be on notice of the complaint.
Knowing that the Institute was considering it, they could either
pursue it independently or await resolution of the case by the Insti
tute. If the other agencies’ investigations are further along than the
Institute’s, the Institute might prefer to await their findings. In any
event, there would be cross-knowledge and, hopefully, co-ordination.
Second, the CPA complained of would know that the matter is
before the board, the state society and the Institute, all at the same
time, and could respond to all of them appropriately. Two questions
arise: First, does such a practice present unreasonable risks of law
suit and second, is such a practice desirable from a policy standpoint?
As to liability, Institute counsel has informed us that the trend
of the law appears to provide greater protection to membership or
ganizations in disseminating information about members. Cases in
volving members of labor unions have sustained the right of the union
to publish information relating to members’ fitness for membership
and loyalty to union ideals. It is not entirely clear what claim to
public trust unions have, but it would seem that professional organi
zations, because of their responsibilities to the public, are in an even
better position than unions to disseminate to properly interested par
ties information concerning a member’s or a licensee’s fitness to be
a CPA, or a member of the professional organization.
We feel that there is sufficient protection that from the legal point
of view we can offer to exchange information on complaints to proper
parties at the earliest point possible.
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There is still the policy question whether this is desirable. We have
found that some Institute members faced with charges before both
the Institute and the state board have adopted different defenses for
each of the two bodies.
They may, for example, wish to represent themselves at the trial
by their professional societies or by the Institute on the theory that
this is essentially a trial by their peers, while they would choose to be
represented by legal counsel in the state board proceeding at which
their right to practice as a CPA may be in jeopardy. In addition,
they may make admissions to their professional organizations that
they would not make to their licensing body.
The basic question is whether the Institute, for example, desires
to pass on to other bodies a complaint against a member, the validity
of which has not yet been assessed by the ethics committee. Suppose
the complaint was passed on to a state society and the ethics commit
tee later found that it was groundless ? Would the transmission of
the finding of “not guilty” be sufficient to wipe the slate clean, or
would the member, nevertheless, be harmed in the eyes of his society
by the mere notification of an allegation of misconduct?
I would argue strongly that a member is not discredited by being
complained against and I am sure that most persons who have worked
in the ethics field would agree than many complaints which come
before ethics committees are groundless.
This question is therefore a matter of policy which will be con
sidered in due course by the Institute’s ethics committee and perhaps
later by the Institute’s executive committee. I submit, however, that
it’s a proposal worthy of your serious consideration in the panel
sessions which will follow these talks and your reactions to it would
be very helpful to us.
There are great advantages to be derived from intra-professional
communications of this type. As an example, through the Institute’s
Washington office a few years ago, the ethics committee was alerted
to testimony of a member before a Senate subcommittee. Since the
testimony raised several ethical questions, a case was opened and
the member was asked to comment on the points raised. His reply
was satisfactory to the committee, which then wrote to him, thanked
him for his co-operation and told him the case was closed because no
violation had been found.
In the meantime, and without the committee’s knowledge, the
state board of accountancy was conducting an investigation concern
ing the matters about which the member testified to the Senate. The
board’s investigation was broader than the Institute’s. The CPA de
fended before the board by showing the letter written on behalf of
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the Institute’s ethics committee indicating that no violation had been
found on the facts considered. This was an obvious embarrassment to
the board and to the Institute. After an extended board hearing,
the member’s certificate was revoked and the case is currently in the
courts. We would hope that the courts will recognize that the Insti
tute’s action was based upon a more limited set of facts than the
board’s and does not constitute an approval of all the member’s activi
ties. The matter is again before the Institute’s ethics committee, but
no action is likely until the court action is resolved.
The story highlights the desirability of exchanging information at
an early stage. It also points up some of the problems involved.
Suppose the board had had no complaint against the member and
suppose further that the Institute learned of his Senate testimony,
opened the case and notified the state board and society that he was
under investigation or, as the Institute’s bylaws put it, "under char
ges.” Suppose the Institute’s committee decided that no violation had
been shown. Has it harmed the member’s professional standing by
disseminating information before making this determination? Should
it notify the society and the board before closing the matter, or having
notified them initially, should it notify them first of its intention to
close the case? What if they object to its being closed?
Can any of the bodies really dispose of the matter without know
ing what the other investigations have turned up and if all the bodies
have the same information, is it not fair to conclude that the finding
of guilt or innocence of the charge should really be the same among
all three bodies, even if the penalty assessed by each with respect to
such guilt is different because of their varying interests in the matter ?
Clearly there are problems when a complaint is filed with one
body and all of the bodies are to be notified of the charges. But
the disciplinary effort would be greatly strengthened by such an ex
change, to the obvious benefit of the profession as a whole.
There are fewer problems, of course, if notification is made after
a preliminary determination has been made by the ethics committee
and the case is set down for a trial. But, with such procedure, the
time during which the CPA is exposed to the disciplinary process is
necessarily extended. As I mentioned, there seems to be little prob
lem in exchanging information after the disciplinary action is taken,
except that widely disparate results might occur; and when I refer
to information in any of this context, I mean at least a copy of the
charge and the basic supporting documents underlying the charge.
We feel that even more than this can be legitimately exchanged—
even the transcripts of hearings—but again, this is a subject for your
discussion today.
All this points up some of the problems the profession faces in its
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multiple jurisdictional structure. We now have the SEC, the state
boards, the state societies and the Institute, each with its own discipli
nary powers. Thought should be given to alleviating this duplication.
Presently, a member charged with unethical conduct may be faced
with four major hearings and perhaps several minor ones before local
committees. On analysis, however, a similarity in the interests and
positions of state societies and the Institute appears in that they are
both voluntary professional organizations. Consideration might be
given to the possibility of combining these groups’ disciplinary efforts.
For example, would it be desirable for the society and the Insti
tute to hold one joint trial before an impartial board consisting of
members of both the society and the Institute, with the ethics com
mittee of each group collaborating on the presentation of the case
and with the decision applicable to the status of membership in both
the society and the Institute ?
Or might it be desirable that the Institute turn over to the socie
ties enforcement of the rules dealing with professional behavior—
solicitation, advertising, encroachment and the like—while the states
turn over to the Institute enforcement of the technical standards,
with the decision of each body affecting the membership in the other?
This seems a reasonable division with respect to our responsibility,
since what constitutes professional behavior could probably be best
handled on a local level while the Institute as the body which sets
technical standards might better concern itself with violations of those
technical standards. Of course, either of these possible solutions must
be preceded by a greater uniformity of codes and trial procedures
than now exist.
State boards are in a somewhat different position since they are
hardly voluntary professional organizations and are probably more
restricted by law in what they can do, but if for example state boards
can make use of the uniform grading service for the CPA exam,
might they not also be able to make use of the findings of a hearing
board some of whose members are members of the state board, the
others being representatives of the state society concerned and possibly
of the Institute ?
Perhaps the legal problems in this suggestion are insurmountable.
Perhaps only state board members can sit on the hearing panel. If so,
can the society be responsible for developing the case, then presenting
it, as prosecution, to the board? Perhaps none of these suggestions
will ever be adopted because the organizations concerned will not want
to give up their sovereignty, will not want to let anyone else deter
mine the fate of their members.
If this is the case, other avenues should be explored since the pres
ent situation is inefficient, expensive and sometimes unfair to the re
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spondent. This is another possible subject for discussion at your panel
sessions.
The disciplinary effort is plagued by two major problems: the
lack of funds and the timidity, if that’s the word, to fully enforce
ethical standards. The latter attitude often stems not from fear or
disinterest, but from a natural concern over the welfare of others in
whose place we could easily see ourselves.
The financial burdens on state boards in disciplining registrants
are considerable. Travel and available time are involved. Legal coun
sel must be retained. A record of the proceeding must be kept for
reference in the event of a legal challenge.
While this burden can be handled by many states, we know of
several where the holding of one hearing drained the treasury for
the year.
One answer may be to raise registration fees, many of which are
extremely low, when one considers that what is involved is a license
to earn a living as a CPA. Many professional society dues rates ex
ceed the board’s registration fee and if CPAs will pay the greater
amount voluntarily to their professional society, why cannot the com
pulsory registration fee be at least in an equal amount ?
If legislatures will not permit an increase in fees, perhaps the
CPA society can apportion a percentage of its dues to support state
board activities. One of the members here suggested to me yesterday
that in his state, at least, this would be a legal impossibility since the
Attorney General is of the opinion that a private organization can
not support a state body in this way.
I’ve discussed now two of my original three points: the exchange
of information at the earliest stage and the possibility for improving
the machinery for enforcement. My final point is whether there is
sufficient awareness of professional ethics and concern for its enforce
ment among practitioners.
As to basic awareness, it seems that the accounting profession
suffers from the same lack of exposure to ethical principles in the
pre-entry years as other professions. I know of only two law schools
which give a formal course on legal ethics and these are one credit
exposure courses. I don’t know of any college having a formal course
in ethics for potential public accounting practitioners although many
colleges, I understand, attempt to weave ethical considerations
throughout their accounting courses.
Many state boards now give an open or closed book ethics exam
as part of the CPA exam and several state boards give complimentary
copies of Ethical Standards of the Accounting Profession to successful
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CPA candidates. We recommend both of these activities to those of
you who have not yet adopted them.
How many state societies or boards promote awareness of ethical
standards by offering to present programs on professional ethics to
collegiate accounting clubs? How many firms include in their training
programs a course on professional ethics? Since ethics is largely a
state of mind—a professional attitude—perhaps it can be learned
best within the firm from the men who have developed it and lived it.
But even if every practitioner is fully aware of every nuance
of professional ethics, the system is doomed to failure unless, when
substandard work or unethical practice by another comes to a person’s
attention, he takes the appropriate steps to see that it doesn’t happen
again. These steps can take many forms.
If the matter is minor, the practitioner might want to contact
the erring CPA himself or he might wish to report the matter in
formally to a member of the state board or the state society ethics
committee, so that a phone call or a personal contact can be made by
one of these men in his official capacity. Many minor, unintentional
violations in the professional behavior category can be effectively
handled in this way. But as Bill Caldwell previously mentioned, in
formal handling can be dangerous because it may fail to disclose a
trend which the society or board should know about.
Minor violations of the technical standards which seem not to
warrant disciplinary action are often referred by the Institute’s ethics
committee to the practice review committee, as an educational matter.
Matters submitted to the practice review committee in the first place
cannot be referred by practice review up to the ethics committee, no
matter how serious the matter is.
In speaking to a few of the delegates, I’ve found that their pro
cedures forbid the ethics committee from turning anything over to
practice review. However, since the Institute’s practice review com
mittee provides educational services only and has no disciplinary
function, we don’t face this problem at the Institute.
The important thing is that improper practices not go unchecked.
More serious matters or repeated minor infractions, of course, require
formal handling before the professional societies and boards. The im
portant thing is that they not go unreported.
We need a massive educational program to remind practitioners
of their responsibility to bring complaints to the proper authority.
Nobody likes a “squealer” and few of us want to be our brother’s
keeper, but as John Lawler noted in his Managing Director’s Report to
Council a few weeks ago, “squealer,” “rat” and the like are the jargon
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of the underworld and such expressions should have no place in the
dictionary or lexicon of a profession. When a practitioner defends
by saying, “Sure, it’s wrong, but everybody does it!” his violation
is far the worse for not reporting “everybody” in the first place, or
at least trying to make them stop the undesirable practice.
Until we can say with confidence that when a practitioner learns
of substandard work or unethical behavior by another, he takes ap
propriate action, we are not truly a self-disciplining profession. I
submit to you that it’s all one “ball of wax.” All violations must be
effectively dealt with and, as a first step, all violations must be re
ported. They won’t be reported unless we can deal with them effec
tively and we can’t deal with them effectively unless we find a way
to better co-ordinate our efforts.
.With co-ordinated efforts, the accounting profession can have a
disciplinary record second to none.

Discussion
Mr. Richard Helstein: Might it not be a first step in establishing com

munications if you would send copies of Institute counsel’s memo
randum to the various state societies so they can submit this to their
counsel for review?
Mr. Schneeman: We don’t have this in a written opinion yet, Dick,
but if we can get a written opinion out of him, we’d be willing to.
I’m sure we can research the question and get the appropriate law.
Speaker from the floor: I would like to direct a question to Mr. Schnee

man.
At what level, or what degree of seriousness would you like to
have state boards report violations to the Institute?
Suppose you have a very minor infraction and you call the man
in and discuss it with him and the matter is settled. Would you
notify the Institute ?
Mr. Schneeman: I should think if, on the local level, you’re satisfied to
handle a complaint in this informal way that we probably shouldn’t
be notified.
On the other hand, this is probably a question that the ethics com
mittee could answer better than I could because I don’t mean to set
policy for them.
I think we should be interested in getting as much information as
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possible on all practitioners, even if it’s minor in nature, so that at
least it can be noted in the files that we keep.
Probably the fact that the state board took an informal action
and was satisfied with it would indicate to the ethics committee that
they should do similarly.
It would, I think, help the state board’s action for the Institute’s
ethics committee to write to the man also and say that this infraction
has been called to their attention and that they concur with the state
board’s finding. This wouldn’t require a hearing at all before the
Institute, but it would show the practitioner that there is co-ordination
between the different bodies and that he should behave in the future.
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Implementing Ethical Codes
A Mock Trial

Over the years, the Institute has often been asked by state societies
and by some state boards of accountancy for information and assist
ance in conducting their first disciplinary hearing.
To examine the types of problems encountered in disciplinary
hearings and to illustrate how a fair trial can be conducted, a mock
trial was held during the third session of the conference. The charges
were taken from previous matters brought before the Trial Board by
the Institute’s ethics committee.
The procedures followed were identical to those of an actual trial,
except that the internal discussion of the Board members leading to
their decision, which in an actual trial would be in closed session, was
conducted at this hearing in the open.
The discussion following the trial showed again that men will
differ in determining guilt and in imposing a penalty once guilt is
established.
While the session seemed to be of more interest and perhaps greater
value to representatives of states which had little experience in con
ducting hearings of this sort, it was felt that all benefited from the
presentation.
Because it would be difficult to properly edit the transcript of the
hearing to a size which could be accommodated in this booklet, only
this factual statement of the session is included. However, state so
cieties and boards of accountancy who are interested in reviewing
the transcript and exhibits of the trial are invited to contact the Insti
tute and the transcript will be made available to them on a loan basis.
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The Conference Concludes
Marvin L. Stone...

The basis of every profession is a body of specialized knowledge.
The professional skill that we have leads to power from which
stems social responsibility, as does all power.
The use of our professional knowledge also requires judgment and
the public is entitled to feel that our professional judgments are made
with the public’s best interest at heart and that we don’t have any
personal axe to grind.
A professional man can serve the public effectively only if he
serves in an atmosphere of public confidence and public trust.
When our public has no confidence in us, we have little to offer
society.
A profession must discipline itself to merit and foster this public
trust and confidence. A layman, certainly, is not qualified to specify
or enforce ethical rules. And, of course, rules are useful only if they’re
enforced. Consequently, enforcement is necessary if rules are to have
meaning.
This ethics conference, the first of many, I hope, is living proof
of CPAs ’ concern for this obligation to the public.
The enunciation of ethical rules, as all of you well know, is very,
very difficult. It is a most serious problem and a most difficult one.
And the application of these rules, as you perhaps noted in the
mock trial this morning, is even more difficult than their enunciation.
The observance of ethical rules is largely a matter of self-disci
pline. While the threat of penalties might deter a few, the preponder
ance of CPAs observe rules of professional conduct because of their
own moral code and personal convictions.
If the preponderance of CPAs were unwilling to obey the rules,
there’s no way on earth that we could enforce their observance.
Similarly, if the general public were all to engage in stealing, it’s
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obvious that no police force, of whatever size, could keep citizens from
stealing.
So it is then with any type of enforcement. Primarily, we must
rely on the people’s own moral code to promote enforcement.
In my opinion, the preponderance of ethical infractions are due
not to willfulness, but to ignorance. This suggests, then, a need for
greater educational efforts to dispel this ignorance.
I don’t mean to suggest that we limit our present enforcement
procedures, because I believe they are also important. A rule without
enforcement is without teeth.
However, while we can enhance compliance through enforcement,
I think the basic problem in professional ethics is one of dispelling
ignorance of the standards. If our educational efforts were increased,
we would find less and less need to impose disciplinary sanctions.
Now to put the discussion of ethics into perspective, I’d like to talk
about one particular ethical rule, perhaps the most important one.
This rule is contained as part of Article II which deals with tech
nical standards. It is Rule 2.02 which provides that a CPA is guilty
of an act discreditable to the profession if he is materially negligent
in the conduct of his examination or in making his report thereon.
Enforcement of this rule has always been hampered by the fact
that it’s very difficult to uncover information as to whether negligence
has actually occurred. First of all, negligence can’t always be uncov
ered by reading a report alone. Such a review might uncover negli
gence in reporting standards, but it certainly isn’t going to uncover,
in most cases, shortcomings in the working papers or in the actual
audit procedures that only a review of working papers would disclose.
Therefore, a work paper review is basic to any investigation of an
alleged technical noncompliance.
Enforcement of this rule is also hampered by the unwillingness of
third parties to disclose information which would lead to a review of
the work papers or the audit report. In this lawsuit-happy world in
which we live, bankers and others using financial statements are very
hesitant to disclose information since they might be subjected to a
liability suit brought by the CPA, the client or any third party who
may have been damaged.
So our work in enforcing this rule is made very difficult and we
must rely to a large extent on voluntary compliance.
Also, the nature of our profession’s work makes a review very
difficult.
All the work of physicians in hospitals is under constant review.
There are tissue committees, and other types of committees, which
look over the physician’s shoulder and police his professional work.
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Lawyers’ courtroom practices are public and are under surveill
ance of other lawyers and the court itself. This, of course, is not true
of all legal work, but at least to that extent a lawyer’s work is under
some degree of surveillance.
An architect’s plans, in most areas, must meet building code re
quirements and many of the plans, at least for very large buildings,
are actually scrutinized by engineers and architects in the employ
of regulatory bodies to determine whether they meet required stand
ards.
Our work, however, just isn’t susceptible to review in the same
way. We don’t work in a hospital or any comparable place. There is
really no place for the equivalent of a tissue committee. When we
represent our client in adversary proceedings, they’re normally done
in private and not in public, and consequently they’re not susceptible
to the same degree of surveillance imposed upon a lawyer in a court
room.
And, finally, our mistakes probably wouldn’t show up so obviously
in our reports as would, for example, an architect’s omissions which
might be found in a review of his plans. You normally need not build
the building to discover that the architect’s plans are unsound.
Possible defects in our reports are not self-evident. From a mere
reading of an audit report, it’s difficult if not impossible to determine
whether the auditor really did all the things that he should have done
before issuing that report.
Our profession has made many efforts on both the national and
state level to eliminate substandard work.
In our state, and I’m sure in many others, volunteer practice
review committees have been organized. In some states practitioners
may turn in work papers for review. The purpose of such reviews is
education, not discipline.
In Colorado, and I’m sure in other states, the state society reviews
financial statements which have been made public, such as United Fund
audits and audits of municipalities. The society then calls to the atten
tion of erring CPAs those areas in which reporting standards seemed
to be inadequate.
Obviously, this type of review is limited primarily to reporting
standards. Only the most obvious inadequacies in field work are likely
to be detected.
The submission of substandard reports by credit grantors for pro
fessional review has always been limited by their concern of legal
liability.
In one city, a bank was sued by a CPA after it had, at the CPA
society’s request, turned in an audit report to see if it was substand
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ard. As a result the bank found itself the defendant in a lawsuit. This
lawsuit has been cited to us by many credit grantors in other parts
of the country when we try to encourage them to co-operate with us.
So we face a confidentiality problem whenever we attempt to ferret
out substandard work. Other professions solve this problem in a way
not readily available to us. For example, a patient entering a hospital
is usually asked to sign a statement which permits the hospital to
release information about his treatment. It would be hard to imagine
a CPA’s client signing a statement which would permit the CPA to
disclose confidential information about the client to third parties.
The concept of confidentiality is probably the largest road-block
to a comprehensive and constant effort by the profession to ferret out
improper work.
Even the work papers themselves would be of limited use in many
respects. If someone indicated in his work papers that he had per
formed certain required steps when he hadn’t, there’s really no way
to uncover his dishonesty from the work papers alone.
There have been a number of serious proposals put forth by
CPAs as to how we might police ourselves more effectively to up
grade standards and eliminate substandard work, but all of these sug
gestions tend to gloss over the confidentiality problem.
A professor in New Zealand, Edgar Stamp, has put forth a rather
interesting proposal, which was really addressed not to substandard
work, nor to ethical considerations, so much as it was to the upgrading
of accounting principles and the improvement of uniformity.
He proposed an accounting court supported by assessments on
CPAs. Paid CPAs would sit on the court as judges, and would decide
whether the accounting principles reflected in the audited financial
statements were proper. The judges would then issue, in effect, an
opinion of their own.
The CPA who did the auditing would be obliged to cite any issues
which he felt were cloudy and he would indicate his opinion as to
which principle he felt should be used. The accounting court however
would have the final say.
The idea has much merit, since it would bring into the open many
of the decisions which are now made in closed rooms by all of us. It
would produce a large body of precedent that accounting theorists
would have an opportunity to examine. They could see some of the
things we do and perhaps learn something from them, in the same
way that law students learn from reported cases.
However, the time lag implicit in this proposal, and the numbers
of CPAs that would be required to do the tremendous amount of
work, make the idea impractical, in my opinion.
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The use of compulsory inspection teams is another approach.
Many of the large firms and CPA firm associations now have quality
control programs whereby teams go from office to office and perform
a post-audit review of work papers. Some smaller firms may also
do this on a co-operative basis.
The program, of course, creates a confidentiality problem when
review is carried out by non-firm members. A client’s work papers
certainly may not be shown to anyone outside your own firm without
the client’s permission. In addition, the sheer size of this task would
be enormous if, for example, a periodic inspection by a team from
the Institute or the state societies were compulsory.
Such a review could only be done by CPAs and the number of
CPAs presently available is inadequate to keep up with the demands
of regular work.
The Institute’s planning committee has made an accreditation
proposal which is similar but not compulsory. They recommended
that accreditation be made available to any firm that wishes it by
permitting an inspection team to come in. The firm would pay the
cost of the inspection and would receive some type of stamp of ap
proval if it passed muster.
All of these approaches are meritorious, but I think they all
fail, for one reason or another, usually because of cost or cumber
someness or the time lag involved.
Since most substandard work, in my opinion, is due to ignorance
rather than willfulness, I suggest that we attempt to dispel this ignor
ance by requiring compulsory education.
Therefore, at the risk of being not only the youngest Institute
President in thirty years, but also the one holding the office for the
shortest period of time, I submit a suggestion of my own regarding
a compulsory education requirement.
I recommend that each CPA be required to show periodic evidence
of continuing education in order to maintain his right to continue to
practice. Most states now require a CPA in practice to acquire an
annual permit. I suggest that the annual permit be issued only to
CPAs who submit evidence that they have spent a week of study
during the year. This study wouldn’t necessarily need to be at col
lege. It could be at tax institutes, professional development courses
or any type of technical meeting that would keep them current. I
would not specify the type of education because, obviously, a tax
specialist would require different courses than would a person in
management advisory services or on the audit staff.
And I wouldn’t necessarily require that the courses be taken every
year. A requirement that three weeks’ education be taken every three
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years would permit a CPA to take a longer program every two or
three years.
Now this may seem a little severe. However, I just can’t see any
other way of knowing that we are reaching those practitioners who,
once licensed, never get back to any type of academic exposure; never
go to a CPA society meeting; never open a newsletter; never open a
book to further their professional knowledge.
I would suggest that this education be required by state boards
rather than by the Institute or the state societies because, in my
opinion, this is the only way the requirement has teeth. An Insti
tute or state society compulsory education requirement would prob
ably succeed only in diminishing the membership rolls.
Therefore, I suggest that we get right down to where the idea has
teeth and that’s at the state board level. I’d suggest the requirement
be included in state board rules in such a way that a practitioner who
failed to comply would lose his license to practice.
I would suggest no “grandfather” clause because I am less con
cerned about the new people than I am about the old.
Doctors in every state are required, by their hospital, to maintain
a certain level of attendance at hospital educational meetings to re
main on the staff. Since a doctor without hospital privileges is pretty
well out of business, this requirement has more teeth than may seem
to be the case.
The accreditation of hospitals provides additional teeth because
the hospital association insists on adherence to certain educational
requirements before it will accredit a hospital.
A group of doctors called the Academy of General Practice has
gone even further. This 30,000-member organization that has been in
existence about seven years requires its members to furnish evidence
of at least 150 hours of education every three years in order to retain
membership.
Since this is purely a membership organization, a member is not
disenfranchised if he fails to comply. He does not lose his right 1o
practice.
However, enough members have felt it necessary and advisable
to remain a member of the Academy that they have continued during
these seven years to do what is necessary to maintain their membership.
Of the 30,000, you might be interested to know, 10,000 have agreed
to take a voluntary examination that’s going to be given next July.
This is the first time that the Academy has given such an examination.
A member who fails the examination will not lose his membership in
the Academy; however, he will no longer be a fellow member. A num-
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ber of specialty boards in medicine apply this same technique. A
member must pass an examination to be designated a fellow member.
The Academy of General Practice requires that 50 of the 150
hours be taken as a part of a course at a medical school or at one of
the accredited courses given by the Academy. The other hours can be
taken at any type of a workshop, institute or educational meeting,
other than a pure business meeting of a hospital staff or other profes
sional group.
Some CPAs will probably say that experience is the best teacher
and that there’s no need for a compulsory education requirement
since we’re getting a great deal of education every day we’re in prac
tice. I do not demean the importance or the value of experience.
However, I don’t think there is any substitute for academic re
freshers.
Much of the experience to which many CPAs are exposed is shal
low in nature. In too many cases “experience” means only continuous
repetition of the same low level work.
A person practicing at this level often fails to keep up with cur
rent developments in accounting, auditing and all the related fields.
He is simply not serving his client in the manner in which the client
is entitled to be served.
An interesting book by Howard Ross called The Elusive Art of
Accounting, a book that I can recommend to all of you, says that
accounting is the language of business, which is a quote we’ve all
seen many, many times. But then he points out that as a language it’s
really not a body of philosophical concepts, and consequently, it’s con
tinuing to evolve in the same way that language is. A thirty- or forty
year old dictionary would be pretty well out of date. And so is the
information in the minds of many of our practitioners who haven’t
taken an academic refresher for thirty or forty years.
As I said before, CPAs are licensed to protect the public. I would
think that real protection requires something more than a one-time
evaluation or accreditation. Our license grants us a legal monopoly
and a legal monopoly carries with it a responsibility to give the pub
lic everything to which it is entitled. The monopoly which we have
been given can also be taken away if the public does not receive the
service it deserves.
A compulsory education requirement, of course, is not the whole
answer.
Ideally, perhaps we should all take an examination every three
to five years. I reject this idea, because I think it goes too far to be
practical.
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Since we all travel such diverse routes, it would take a multitude
of examinations, not a single examination, to test us adequately.
Upon entering the profession, CPAs share a common core of
knowledge, but by the time each CPA has been in practice five or ten
years, he is traveling a road different from that of many of his col
leagues. Some travel the tax road; others are in operations research;
others are in auditing; and others are in systems work. Many differ
ent examinations would be needed to test CPAs who practice in such
divergent ways.
Consequently, I don’t think the examination route is practical
and I really don’t think it’s necessary. I believe, as I’ve said before,
that most of the ethical infractions are the result of ignorance. If we
get to the heart of the problem with compulsory education, I believe
we can dispel much of the ignorance.
Whether or not my proposal is adopted, all the present efforts to
ferret out substandard work should continue—the practice review
committees, the review of public files, the awareness of the obligation
for self-discipline.
I don’t believe that any of this is wasted effort by any means and
I think it should continue. The nature of our professional work makes
self-discipline essential. Society, however, is bound to protect itself.
If we don’t discipline ourselves, the government will.
The loss that would follow from such an occurrence would fall
not just on the regulated professional alone, but even more heavily
on society generally. For when the government feels it is necessary
to regulate a business or a profession, it usually does so by the means
of some special agency.
Such a regulatory agency is likely to be given not only law-making
functions, but judicial and executive functions as well, short-circuit
ing the proven principles of checks and balances, and of due process.
Happily, both the machinery and the spirit of self-discipline are
strong in accounting, as your presence here attests. But the task is
never-ending and that is why the examination of professional ethics,
which you have been undertaking here is so important.
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Two impressions came out of the morning panel sessions: First,
the profession faces formidable tasks and, second, there is no paucity
of good ideas on how to cope with our problems. I think we have a
good deal to work on in future meetings.
My function is that of a reporter, but naturally I have to be an
editor too, because I had to select from the discussion groups those
things I thought to be significant; my emphasis may be somewhat dif
ferent from yours. Therefore, if my reporting is faulty, don’t be
afraid to raise questions at the appropriate time.
It seems there was a substantial overlap between the ideas discus
sion generated in the morning and afternoon sessions. As the day
went on, some of the ideas that were generated in the morning were
developed more fully. Accordingly, I’m going to try to limit myself
to significant problems that were raised in the morning and leave
some of the proposed solutions that matured in the afternoon to
Wally Olson.
The speakers in the morning tended to set the scene for the discus
sion groups, and were rather specific in the area that each treated.
The discussion groups, on the other hand, tended to develop rather
broad problem areas and ideas about them.
The new form of practice before the Internal Revenue Service
did not seem to generate much concern within the groups.. There was
a consensus that up to this time the new procedure has worked pretty
well.
In addition, there was a consensus that the problem of disciplining
is the profession’s problem and should not be the problem of the
Internal Revenue Service. Therefore, the conclusion was that the
present procedure is preferable to the former procedure. However,
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there seemed to be some problem in getting information from the In
ternal Revenue Service to process ethics cases. Some specific examples
of this were discussed.
The second major item was an overall evaluation of the effective
ness of what the profession is doing today and the problems that we
are encountering. There was a general feeling that what we are doing
is good and that we have a right to be proud of our accomplishment.
On the other hand, there was no question in any of the partici
pants’ minds that there are some rather serious deficiencies. I think
that we’d best discuss these deficiencies now.
There seem to be three areas in which enforcement problems arise:
The first of these might be termed activity reflecting upon the
character of the individual and his fitness to practice in the profes
sion. This relates to criminal prosecutions and to activity that raises
a question of moral character. It was felt that in this area we are
doing a pretty good job because it’s the type of thing that we can
get our teeth into. We have a court record, a judgment or a convic
tion that we can deal with. We don’t have the problem of trying to
ascertain the facts independently.
The second area dealt with relations affecting other practitioners.
These are the relatively local issues, such as advertising, solicitation,
and other things of that sort. There was a general feeling that we’re
doing a pretty good job in dealing with this particular area. There
were some thoughts expressed that maybe there is a lack of definition
of the standards in some of these areas.
Perhaps our present concepts about advertising, publicity, and
so forth, still need development or challenge. Maybe we need more
definite guidelines for practitioners in this area. However, the gen
eral feeling was that we’re doing a good job of policing this kind
of thing.
The third area—and this is the most important one—deals with
activity or conduct affecting relations with third parties. This en
compasses the problem of substandard practice, be it technical or
otherwise, and here the majority of the groups felt that we are not
really doing a good job.
We ask ourselves, then, Why aren’t we doing a good job? What
are the problems that we face?
First, as Marvin Stone indicated, there seems to be sheer ignorance
on the part of those who are the violators in this area. There’s a sig
nificant need for education, both of a technical nature and of an
ethical nature.
Then, we have the problem of nonmembers of the Institute or state
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society who do not receive the literature, and who in most cases don’t
participate in the professional development programs and other edu
cational activities that are sponsored for the profession. This is a
major problem area; to my knowledge, no real solution was developed
in the discussion groups.
It was generally conceded that we have to do more educating, but
the best way to implement an educational program isn’t clear at this
moment.
A second problem in this area is our inability to obtain the facts
in order to deal with this kind of case. Now, why can’t we get the
facts ?
There is a reluctance on the part of individuals to bring facts to
the attention of the proper groups, whether they be ethics committees
or state boards. This is a manifestation of a present-day social prob
lem. We’re dealing here with the same kind of reluctance to avoid in
volvement that we’ve seen when witnesses see persons being molested
on the street and refuse to get involved. I think there’s a social re
action developing today—a philosophy of noninvolvement.
A part of this reluctance of people to become involved appears
to be cynicism on the part of a significant group within the profession
who feel, “Well, we’re not going to get the right results in any event.
We’re only going to hurt ourselves one way or the other if we pursue
this complaint.” We’ve all heard the complaint that one party gets
a different kind of treatment than another. Justified or not, an un
fortunate tension exists between the big and the small firms.
Another problem arises in our dealing with widely publicized
cases involving pending litigation; counsel for a respondent called
to task for violating our standards has often charged, “Look at all
the cases across the country; what have you done about some of these
people?” You try to explain that your inaction stems from care not
to impair a member’s legal rights while litigation is pending, but
some people just won’t be convinced.
Just how to handle these cases is a serious problem, because some
of them go on for years; our present tendency is to hold these cases
in abeyance until there is some resolution of the litigation.
A corollary problem arises when you have a conviction in court
and an appeal is taken. It takes time, sometimes years, to process
the appeal. A critic may see only that this individual has been con
victed and is still a member of the state society or of the American
Institute.
We also have the problem of the multiplicity of jurisdiction that
has been referred to on several occasions. As we’ve seen, an indi-

59

The Conference Concludes

vidual may actually be tried for the same offense in five different
forums.
A CPA may violate the rules of a federal agency and, in effect, be
tried by them. The same offense may become the subject of a prosecu
tion in a federal or state court. He may then be tried by the Ameri
can Institute, a state society and a state board.
This presents a very serious problem, because there’s something,
we believe, fundamentally wrong with such a system that isn’t com
patible with our concept of American jurisprudence. So this is a
broad area that we have to deal with.
We also have the problem, which is somewhat related, of communi
cation between the many forums that have jurisdiction in these cases.
Here we find there are all sorts of restraints, some legal, some
emotional and some political, that get wrapped up in the problem
of communicating information from one agency level to another.
We have the problem of lack of uniformity between these various
organizations. Our rules of conduct vary and in some cases, they vary
significantly. It is possible for a member to be expelled from one or
ganization while there is no basis for expulsion in another organiza
tion. There’s a glaring inconsistency, in the public eye, when a mem
ber is expelled from one professional organization and yet remains
a member in good standing of another.
We have the whole problem of the inadequacy of money and man
power at the state board level in many states. Now, this isn’t true
in every state, but it is true in many, many states. When we talk
about resources, it must be kept in mind that we don’t always talk
only about money. We’re talking about know-how. We’re talking
about staff. We’re talking about the sheer ability and inclination to
deal with the problems that we’ve identified.
We have the problem of the lack of public understanding. We’ve
talked about the public’s lack of understanding of the meaning of
the reports that we render. Together with that is the total lack of
understanding by some people of just what kind of results they
should expect from the professional accountant. Of course, along with
that, there is the problem of getting meaningful communication from
people of this sort.
I referred before to the legal problems in the disclosure of in
formation ; this seems to become more serious all the time.
In fact, there was an article in The Wall Street Journal today
about one of the medical grievance committees that had been sued by
an ophthalmologist. He charged that their activity had resulted in an
impairment of his practice, since he has lost referrals and other work
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as a result of some publicity that had attended the disciplinary pro
ceedings.
I’m sure that this is not a complete listing of all the problems
that have been discussed in the morning panels, but these are the ones
that seemed to me to be the most significant.
There seemed to be a general consensus that the solution to some
of these problems was that in the long run, state boards are really
the agency with which enforcement should rest. However, I don’t
think that anybody feels that it’s feasible at this time to go com
pletely in this direction.
So far as the legal problem is concerned, the thinking was that
the Institute ought to offer more assistance to the state societies and
even the state boards. We should attempt to arrive at a better defini
tion of our legal position, and to give the local groups some assistance
in dealing with these problems on a day-to-day basis. In other words,
How do you correspond about these cases without exposing yourself
to legal risk of liability?
Another problem area seems to be the inability in so many in
stances to fit the penalty to the crime. For example, all the voluntary
professional organizations can do is expel the individual. We can’t
seriously impair his ability to practice. One of the factual situations
cited here was a California case in which the individual was using a
neon sign. Rather than take down his sign, he allowed himself to be
expelled from the California Society. Since the state Board does not
prohibit advertising, he’s still a CPA. The story showed that this
CPA apparently measured his membership in the Society against the
value of the sign and decided the sign was more valuable to him.
It’s pretty obvious that if we are to get at the really fundamental
causes of some of these things, we ought to be able to prescribe edu
cation in some of these violations, particularly violations of the tech
nical standards. I understand that this is being tried, at least in one
or two areas.
It was suggested that, in cases of solicitation, we ought to be able
to force the practitioner to withdraw from the engagement that he
secured in that manner. However, problems have arisen with respect
to even that kind of penalty, since if a client is satisfied and wants
to retain the practitioner, we’re in a poor position to say he can’t.
Another area where significant problems exist is in the area of
fees and their relationship to the quality of the work that’s being per
formed. I think we’ve all experienced the circumstances in which it
was pretty obvious that the fee was not commensurate with the scope
of the engagement and the work suffered accordingly.
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I was instructed to point out in this area that “the competitive
bidding rule isn’t dead!” That has a lot of ramifications that we
don’t have time to discuss here. But in this particular area, the fee
area, I would like to suggest that Opinion No. 18 of the Institute’s
ethics committee has a lot of potential that we haven’t completely ex
plored yet.
Also, many of our fee problems stem from what I would like to
call “the case of the apologetic practitioner!” I have seen many,
many fee problems that arise when a practitioner goes to his client,
with hat in hand, apologizing for the size of his fee before he ever
sends a bill.
I understand that Louisiana has a very interesting rule on fees of
successor accountants which I don’t wholly understand, but which
I think ought to receive some publicity.
Another area that was discussed was independence. With respect
to fees, I think it was generally conceded that independence is fun
damentally integrity, but that there might be a problem when a
single audit fee is large in relation to a practitioner’s total practice.
Does this really have any influence upon his independence?
I think that covers the problem areas we discussed; I hope we
can now work out the solution.
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One of the first problems we talked about in the afternoon dis
cussion was whether or not we have really done enough to push the
activities of our practice review committees; whether they were in
fact effective; and whether or not they were desirable vehicles for
education of our members at least in the area of reporting standards.
There were quite a number of mixed conclusions that came out
of the discussions. I’ll try to summarize these for you.
First, there was a general consensus that the effectiveness of prac
tice review throughout the various states was mixed. Of course, in
some states there are no practice review committees and some states
are just now setting them up. It also became quite clear that many
of the members, at least in one of the discussion groups, were not
too familiar with what was being done by the American Institute’s
practice review committee. Few participants were aware of the fact
that a publication had come out giving some statistics and informa
tion relating to the Institute’s practice review experience.
I think this clearly indicates that we have a real education process
on our hands even among ourselves—and we are supposed to be knowl
edgeable—on what is being done by these review committees. This
group and the general membership must give them our co-operation
and participation.
Some of the groups felt, however, that it was too soon to try to
judge the effectiveness of these committees. They felt it would be
unfair to conclude that practice review committees were not doing
the job since they had been established so recently. The membership
may not have had sufficient time to become thoroughly familiar with
their activities and the ways in which they might co-operate with the
committees.
I don’t think anybody took the position that they were not de63
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sirable. All the groups pretty much concluded that practice review
committees were extremely valuable; that we ought to expend more
energy in strengthening their activities and perhaps in making them
more aggressive, particularly on the state level. One member of the
Institute’s practice review committee indicated that they had a very
steady flow of work through their committee, which indicates that
more and more reports are being referred to them for review.
I think we’ve heard mentioned several times over the last two
days in various discussions, and in the discussion groups as well,
that banks and credit grantors probably are not a good source for
complaints of substandard reporting. Because of the legal liability
problem, it’s unlikely that we’ll ever be too successful in convincing
these people to refer many reports for review.
The groups concluded that there are two areas on which we ought
to concentrate.
One is in our membership itself, which has to be the prime source
for referrals of reports to the practice review committee. This indi
cates that we ought to concentrate on advising the members of the
work these committees do and of what is expected of members in re
ferring substandard reports to their attention.
The second source that everybody seemed to agree was a good
one is governmental agencies. It was felt that in some states a good
job has been done in co-ordinating the work of the practice review
committees with governmental agencies with which reports must be
filed. Where these are being referred for review, a good deal of work
is being done in educating practitioners regarding compliance with
the reporting requirements of these agencies.
One other conclusion that came out of the groups was that they
would like to see the Institute be more active in sifting the complaints
that come to the practice review committee from the federal agencies.
It was felt that these ought to be sent down to the state practice
review committees for handling. We didn’t go into whether legal
problems might exist in such a program.
As has been pointed out previously by President Stone and others,
the practice review committees are probably limited in the range of
education they can engage in, since most of what comes to their at
tention relates almost entirely to reporting standards. And most of
them are purely educational and have no enforcement authority.
What’s done in the field in relation to auditing standards usually
does not come to the attention of the practice review committees, so
we have to recognize that the area in which these committees can func
tion is rather limited.
I’m sure I haven’t covered all of the discussions, but what I have
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reported is the general consensus about the work of the practice re
view committees.
The second major problem area that was discussed at length was
the problem of the state boards not having adequate funds to carry
on investigation activities in handling their cases. The questions were
raised whether or not it would be practicable or desirable to have
state societies attempt to provide needed financial support to the state
boards, and whether or not it would be feasible to increase registra
tion fees in the various states to provide the state boards with the
funds needed to do a better job on the handling of their cases.
The general conclusion was that it would probably be impractical
to try to get the states to adjust their registration fees to an adequate
level to handle the investigation activity. In some states, the regis
tration fees go into a general fund and would appear to be unavail
able for the hiring of permanent investigators.
Some of the groups explored other possibilities for the state so
cieties to help out in this investigation activity and it was felt that
it not only wouldn’t be proper for the state societies to try to pro
vide funds directly to the state boards but in some states might
even be against the law. It was felt that the state societies could do
something else—that they might take on the investigation activity
themselves, and finance this out of their operating funds. After com
pleting the investigation, they could turn the results over to the
state board for adjudication.
This would coincide with what Keith Cunningham mentioned
earlier: that the key to the enforcement problem lies in getting the
state boards to be more active and more aggressive in their enforce
ment activities.
In one of the groups, a question arose regarding possible conflict
of interest if the suggestion was followed that the state societies
carry on investigation activities and refer the information to state
boards. It was felt that this wouldn’t create any serious problem be
cause the state boards would be free to accept or reject information,
and to use it as they saw fit; they would not be restricted only to
that information in any case.
There was also the feeling that there was a real need for close
communication. This was a common thread that ran throughout all
the discussions—the need for better communications, particularly
with the state boards.
The third main area that was discussed was the proposition that
there ought to be some consideration given to combining the Insti
tute’s Trial Board with the states’ trial boards to eliminate what ap
pears to be an unnecessary duplication. Earlier, Keith Cunningham
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referred to the fact that in some cases a member could conceivably
be subjected to hearings or trials at three different levels—govern
mental agencies, his state board of accountancy and his professional
societies.
Certainly, there is an overlapping between the state and the In
stitute levels, but on this particular question, there were very mixed
opinions. Many participants felt that the present machinery was de
sirable and should be continued, but that it probably needed a good
deal of improvement. Communications between the three levels should
be increased, and it should be clear which level should hear the com
plaint first.
Other participants felt that the matter ought to be studied in
depth to see if the duplication between the state and the Institute
could be eliminated.
One group suggested that perhaps the state societies ought to
take over all of the enforcement activities and leave the ethics com
mittee of the Institute to act or function as a high level policy group
which would be persuasive in nature. To do this would require a
change in the bylaws of the Institute which would provide that any
thing concluded at the state level would be binding on the members
of the Institute.
There is, no doubt, some reluctance to do this until there is a
greater uniformity of codes of ethics among the states and until
the machinery in all the states is more adequate and more uniform
than it is now.
Another proposal that was discussed was that behavioral matters
be left solely to the states and that matters involving standards be
left solely to the Institute. This is something that John Lawler has
suggested in a speech before counsel. There was some feeling among
the discussion groups that this proposal would not work; that the
states would be reluctant to give up any part of their present respon
sibilities, and that they should be as much involved in standards as
they are in behavioral matters, because at the local level they are
more apt to get information concerning violations of standards.
In any event, out of these mixed views there was general agree
ment that the matter was worth studying and some further effort
should be made to see whether there is a way of revising the present
machinery to eliminate the multi-level problem. There was also the
feeling that if the present machinery does continue in its present
form, two things ought to be done.
It was suggested that a standard approach to communication be
tween the Institute and the state societies and state boards should be
developed. There are some beginnings in this direction, as mentioned
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by Don Schneeman yesterday when he quoted the Illinois provision
for exchange of information with the Institute.
A second suggestion was that some attempt be made to establish
a priority for action on cases as they arise. It was felt that a case
should first be reviewed at the state board level, that the second level
should be the state society and the Institute should be the last one
to deal with a case. It was hoped that a greater uniformity of con
clusions would result.
In summary, the general feeling expressed was that three major
areas needed improvement: (1) education of members; (2) better
communication between the three enforcement levels; and (3) better
co-ordination between those three levels.
Education, communication and co-ordination are the key words that
were repeated many, many times in the discussions.
There were several individual recommendations in the education
area: that examinations on ethics ought to be required of all CPA
candidates and more emphasis placed on ethical matters in the CPA
exam; that more attention ought to be given to ethics on programs
of meetings of the state societies and the Institute; that members
should be educated through more articles on ethics.
Regarding communications, there was a strong desire that there
be a fast response among the three levels to requests for disciplinary
information. And, as mentioned earlier, we need to develop a stan
dard format or procedure to facilitate this exchange of information.
Finally, in reference to co-ordination, it was agreed that the pri
mary need was to establish priority, and to arrive at some agree
ment between the three levels as to who would handle a case first.
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Appendix
Opinion of Covington & Burling, Legal Counsel for
the Institute, on Exchange of Disciplinary Information

Participation of American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants in Exchange of Information Involving Disciplin
ary Matters Between the Institute, State Societies, State
Boards and Other Authorities

February 29, 1968

The Institute has requested our advice on the degree of risk of
liability for defamation (libel or slander) which might accompany
the implementation of a program for the co-operative exchange of
disciplinary information concerning member certified public accoun
tants among the Institute, state societies, state boards and other agen
cies which have disciplinary responsibilities in respect of such ac
countants and which have filed with the Institute general requests for
information of such character.
We conclude that the Institute may participate in an exchange
of disciplinary information without material risk of liability, so long
as it continues to observe the restraints that common sense and or
dinary discretion would counsel. Under all but the most unusual cir
cumstances, the current practice of preliminary verifying informa
tion of a disciplinary character whenever practicable before passing
it on to other interested organizations should suffice.
Although we cannot guarantee that the proposed program for ex
change of disciplinary information will not some day result in an
action for defamation brought by an accountant so implicated, we
do advise that the risk of successful prosecution of such a suit is so
remote as to be immaterial in contrast to the benefit the proposed
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exchange would confer upon the organized profession and the public.
The practice of individual certified public accountants may vary
in scope and geographic range; disciplinary authority affecting their
right to practice is spread among such agencies as the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and the various
state boards of accountancy. While not empowered to take away the
right to practice, the state societies and the Institute enforce among
their members codes of ethics designed to maintain high standards
of professional integrity and technical competence.
It is only logical and expedient that such organizations, govern
mental and private, charged with the enforcement of ethical and
technical standards by law or by the general acceptance of the ac
counting profession, should co-operate not only in the formulation of
standards but in their enforcement as well. The policing of the pro
fession is as much a common duty as a common interest.
We contemplate that, when there comes to the attention of the
Institute, by formal complaint, news dispatch, or otherwise, informa
tion indicating misconduct on the part of a member of the Institute,
such information will be forwarded to those organizations reasonably
thought, through his membership or license to practice, to possess a
disciplinary responsibility in the matter without awaiting the com
pletion of the Institute’s own disciplinary process. By this procedure
two desirable results are to be achieved. First, organizations other
than the Institute will be alerted to the possibility of offenses within
their jurisdiction. Second, by the adoption of similar disclosure pro
grams or in response to the Institute’s initial disclosure, it is to be
expected that other organizations will supply the Institute with infor
mation helpful in the conduct of its own disciplinary proceedings.
The Institute would continue procedures reasonably designed to
minimize the dissemination of false information adverse to the pro
fessional reputation of an accountant, but designed also to achieve
reasonable efficiency and dispatch in promoting disciplinary enforce
ment. Thus, where relevant information comes to the attention of the
Institute bearing its own evidence of reliability, for example, a re
lease of the Securities and Exchange Commission or a statement pur
porting to have been verified from a source reasonably believed to be
reliable, the information, together with disclosure of its source, would
normally be promptly forwarded to the state societies and boards
which reasonably appear to be concerned. It would be accompanied
with a request that the recipient supply the Institute with any infor
mation at its disposal touching upon the reported accountant. On the
other hand, when charges or reports lacking such evidence of reliabil
ity reach the Institute, the normal procedure would be to attempt
69

some reasonable preliminary verification prior to dissemination. This
might be accomplished by a confidential letter addressed to and re
questing the comment of the accountant concerned, whose unsatis
factory response or failure even to reply could be sufficient verifica
tion. If appropriate, the Institute might obtain certified copies of an
Indictment, Information or Judgment of Conviction said to have been
rendered against an accountant. A member of the Institute who lives
or practices in the vicinity of the reported accountant could be com
missioned to conduct a confidential and informal investigation.
In all cases, the Institute’s disclosure and request for information
would indicate at least the nature of the source of the Institute’s
information and an appropriate statement indicating the absence of
verification by the Institute or the limited nature of the verification
which has been undertaken. Any exculpatory information would be
included, or forwarded subsequently if later discovered. In all but
the most exceptional cases, disclosure to the appropriate recipients
would precede hearing or disposition by the Trial Board or a sub
board. There would also, of course, be disclosure of any final action
taken by the Institute in the case.
As the circumstances that may be expected to arise will differ
widely, we treat them here in a general way. Where there is doubt as
to the fairness of forwarding a report on a member accountant,
whether because of its nature or because the legitimate interest of
the recipient is reasonably uncertain, it would be advisable for those
making the decisions as to such exchange of information to obtain
the advice of counsel, particularly at the outset of the implementation
of such a program of exchange of information, when those making
the decisions may lack experience concerning the factors which should
be considered. In general, however, the touchstone for guidance is
reasonableness and common sense under the circumstances.
To assist in understanding our position, we turn now to a brief
discussion of the law of defamation, with more particular reference
to what is known as the defense of conditional or qualified privilege.
It is through this principle that the law recognizes the need of persons
and organizations to communicate with one another on matters of
common concern, provided that they do so reasonably, in good faith,
and without improper purpose or motive.
Preliminarily, we must emphasize that defamation is a matter of
state law. Responsibility for a particular communication will thus
turn upon the law of the state in which it is published.1 Though there
1 E.g., Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th
Cir. 1967).
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is sufficient uniformity among the states for the law to be here set out
in general terms, any state society or board planning to participate
in the proposed exchange of information should request its legal
counsel to determine whether local law would require that organiza
tion to follow a more cautious or limited approach than is contem
plated here.
Essential to the understanding of a defamation action is that it
is designed to provide compensation for injury to reputation, rather
than injury to sensibilities.2 The offense thus involves a communica
tion to some person other than the person defamed.3 The law offers
its protection by recognizing as a legally protected interest one’s right
to protect the esteem in which others hold him.
Defamatory statements are made routinely, however, without the
maker incurring material risk of liability. This evidences the fact that
the law will accord to other legal interests—some in appropriate cir
cumstances and some absolutely—a higher priority than the protec
tion of reputation. For example, it is an absolute defense to an action
for defamation for the declarant to prove the truth of his statement.4
Dissemination of the truth, regardless of the speaker’s status or
motive, is protected at the expense of the victim’s reputation. If the
statement, unknown to the maker, is false, however, the defense of
truth is unavailable and the maker must rely upon other defenses.
Nevertheless, there are many occasions on which defamations, sub
sequently proved false, are uttered without liability. They are, it is
said, privileged. Absolute privilege shields certain governmental of
ficers who speak in the course of their duties, even should they know
ingly speak falsehoods or speak maliciously.5 The interest in permit
ting them to discharge their duties without fear of responsibility for
defamation is thought to outweigh the protection offered reputation.
It is a similar, but qualified, privilege that is available to protect
the Institute, its members, and staff, as well as state societies, should
a defamation action arise from the proposed exchange of disciplinary

2 3 Restatement of Torts Sec. 559 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Restatement].

Restatement Sec. 577; Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 108 (3d ed. 1964).

4 E.g., McCuddin v. Dickinson, 230 Iowa 1141, 300 N.W. 308 (1941) ; Alexandria
Gazette Corp. v. West, 198 Va. 154, 93 S.E.2d 274 (1956) ; Restatement Sec. 582.
5 Absolute privilege may also cover communications required by law or between
husband and wife. See Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 109 (3d ed. 1964). For cases in
volving governmental figures, see, e.g., Scott v. Statesville Plywood
Veneer Co.,
240 N.C. 73, 81 S.E.2d 146 (1954) ; Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369
(1967).
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information.6 This qualified privilege to defame is found in a great
variety of situations. It has been summarized in these words:
The proliferation of situations in which these privileges are allowed
evidences a recognition that to conduct their day-to-day affairs,
persons must communicate with one another concerning the people
with whom they associate. In effect, the courts require only that a
defendant act in good faith and as a reasonable man under all the
circumstances, taking into account the importance of the interest
which his communication will serve, the risk of harm to the plaintiff,
and his own relationship to the interest and person involved. De
velopments in the Law—Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 925
(1956).

Commentators have categorized the many situations giving rise
to such a privilege by defining the interest served—that is, the inter
est prevailing over the protection of reputation—in terms of the
parties to the communication. One formulation7 lists five such over
lapping interests supporting, if “sufficiently important,” a condi
tional privilege if the maker knows or reasonably believes his com
munication will serve such an interest: (1) an interest of the
publisher; (2) an interest of the recipient; (3) an interest common
to the publisher and recipient; (4) an interest of some third person;
or (5) a public interest.
It is obvious that whether the maker can reasonably entertain the
belief that his statement furthers such an interest will vary according
to the nature of the interest. Thus, if his own interest is involved,
such a belief might be better founded than if it were solely the
interest of the recipient or a third person. A may be privileged to
tell B, a policeman, that he believes C intends to steal his car. In
so doing he furthers his own sufficiently important interest in retain
ing his property by a communication designed to serve that end. A
public interest in law enforcement would be served as well. Also, if
B, as a prospective employer of C, asks A his opinion of C, then a
qualified privilege attaches to A’s reply, so long as it is uttered in
good faith. A then would speak in service of B’s substantial interest,
6 Regarding both privileges, it has been recently stated:
Both as to absolute privilege and as to qualified privilege, the protection from
liability to suit attaches by reason of the setting in which the defamatory state
ment is spoken or published. The privilege belongs to the occasion. It does not
follow the speaker or publisher into other surroundings and circumstances. . . .
R. II. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 270 N.C. 160, 154
S.E.2d 344, 354 (1967).

7 Restatement Sec. 594-98.
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which B’s request gives him reason to believe he furthers.8 By the
privilege, the law encourages a socially useful response.
In regard to the proposed program for the exchange of disciplin
ary information, the common, as well as individual, interests9 of the
Institute, the state societies, state boards and governmental agencies
to which we have adverted should amply support the defense of
privilege. Moreover, where disclosure of illegal conduct is made to a
responsible governmental authority charged with enforcing the law
violated, that occasion, too, is privileged.10 There should be no need,
as is sometimes the case when the communication would further no
apparent interest, to offer disciplinary information only in response
to a specific and detailed request. The necessity of such a request
disappears where, as here, the interests served are sufficiently impor
tant and adequately identified. This would be so in the case of dis
closure to a state society, if to the Institute’s knowledge the accoun
tant concerned can reasonably be thought a probable member of that
society and that such society has a disciplinary interest in the alleged
misconduct. Similarly, the interest of a governmental agency would
be adequately identified were the accountant concerned reasonably
thought to practice before it or to have been licensed by it and the
alleged misconduct should be conduct in which such agency has a
disciplinary interest. Accordingly, it should be necessary only that
the Institute so conduct its program that, on a particular occasion,
8 See Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 110 (3d ed. 1964). Were absolute assurance of a
privilege here sought, our most conservative advice would be to make disclosure only
pursuant to the recipient’s request for disciplinary information. As one authority
has put it,

The defamer is privileged to respond to almost any request that is apparently
made in good faith if the matter pertains in any way to the legitimate concern
of the person asking information. 1 Harper & James, Law of Torts Sec. 5.25
(1956).

9 The privilege has been described in these words:
It is the general rule in the United States that a qualified privilege is recognized
in cases where the publisher and recipient of the publication have a common
interest which might be reasonably believed to be protected or furthered by the
publication and the publication is made reasonably and in good faith. . . .
Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., Inc., 269 F.2d 375, 391 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 893 (1959).
It has been applied, for example, to protect a union official who libeled a plaintiff in
a widely circulated union publication. Sheehan v. Tobin, 326 Mass. 185, 93 N.E.2d
524 (1950).
10 E.g., Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951). The privilege
may, on occasion, be absolute. See Becker v. Philco Corp., 372 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied,U.S(1967).
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the accountant reported upon cannot claim the privilege was abused.
Abuse turns upon the existence of actual malice, which we may
presently define as improper motive or the lack of good faith. The
shield of privilege could be lost if the plaintiff-accountant, with the
advantage of hindsight, were able to establish improper motive or
bad faith in the circumstances of the disclosure defaming him.11 As
we have said, truth, if proved, would provide an absolute defense.
Were the report untrue, however, the defense would turn upon the
presence or absence of privilege. It would be fatal to such a defense
if it could be shown the maker of the report had knowledge of its
falsity.11
12 Some courts would require that the declarant have ‘‘probable
cause” to believe his utterance true.13 Knowledge of falsity, or ab
sence of some reason to believe truth, establishes the malice necessary
to defeat the privilege. The Institute would be well advised to indicate
in its disclosure the nature of the source of the information conveyed.14
Similarly, malice defeating the privilege could be predicated on
a showing of unreasonable dissemination. It would be unreasonable
to furnish disciplinary information concerning an accountant to
some person or organization not reasonably thought capable of acting
upon it.15 Thus, if the Institute were to receive word of the possible
malpractice of an Iowa accountant, it would be unreasonable to for
ward it to the California society without some basis for belief that
that organization could act upon such information in a way beneficial
to the maintenance of high standards of ethics in the profession,
either by disciplinary proceedings because the accountant was in fact

11 E.g., Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 127 Pac. 533 (1912) ; Annot., 26 A.L.R.
830, 856 (1923). One commentator puts it this way:
A more comprehensive formulation might be that the defendant has abused a
privilege when he does not act for the purpose of furthering the interest which
the privilege is granted to protect. However, in most cases in which the courts
use the term, they are not directly examining the motive of the defendant but
are mechanically inferring the existence of ‘actual malice’ from his unreason
able conduct in making a statement. Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 875, 930 (1956).
It has been said of ‘‘actual malice’’ that ‘‘all definitions in substance come down
to the equivalent of ‘ bad faith ’’’ H. E. Crawford Co. v. Dun
Bradstreet, Inc.,
241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1957).

12 E.g., Caldwell v. Personal Finance Co., 46 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1950).
13 E.g., Baskett v. Crossfield, 190 Ky. 751, 228 S.W. 673 (1920).
14 See Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 930 (1956),
citing Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 95 at 628-29 (2d ed. 1955).
15 E.g., Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So.2d 693 (1955).
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its member or by supplementing the information known to the Insti
tute. It would probably, however, be appropriate to bring the infor
mation to the attention of the Iowa society, if the fact of the accoun
tant’s Iowa residence indicates his probable membership in that
society,16 or that the society would be a likely source of complemen
tary information, whether exculpatory or inculpating.17
Also, information known to the Institute, contemporaneously or
subsequently acquired, that tends to clear or exculpate an accountant
reported upon should be forwarded promptly to those organizations
which have received information adverse to the same accountant. Not
only would such a routine course of action tend to establish the rea
sonableness necessary to a qualified privilege, while serving as well to
lessen injury and damages, but it would also effect a proper regard
for the individual concerned.18

Conclusion
We are persuaded that, because the public and professional wel
fare are served by the enforcement by the accounting profession of
high ethical standards, and because a strong common interest is
so readily apparent among the organizations concerned, qualified
privilege should effectively shield the Institute from legal liability for
defamation arising from the proposed program of exchange of dis
ciplinary information. There should be reasonable restraint, prelimi
nary verification where practicable, and some care to avoid circum
stances supporting a charge of bad faith. Should unusual circum
stances appear, the Institute should consult legal counsel.
Covington & Burling

16 Restatement Sec. 596, Comment c.
17 Consent could provide an additional defense. The Restatement (3 Restatement,
Torts Sec. 583, Comment f) indicates that plaintiff’s consent confers upon defend
ant, so long as he stays within its scope, an absolute privilege immune to defeasance
even on a showing of malice. Prosser, too, catalogues consent as conferring an abso
lute privilege. Prosser, Law of Torts Sec. 109 (3d cd. 1964). Harper and James
(1 Harper & James, Law of Torts Sec. 5.17 (1956)) set out what on balance seems a
more sound position: that consent confers a qualified privilege defeasible by the
establishment of malice. Cf. Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Kev.
875, 931-32 (1956). The utility of consent, as an additional defense for the Institute,
would depend upon further modification of the bylaws and membership application
forms, unless it were obtained directly from the accountant concerned.
18 See Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp. 329 Mass. 193, 107 N.E.2d 295 (1952) ; Prosser,
Law of Torts Sec. 111 (3d ed. 1964) ; Harper & James, Law of Torts Sec. 5.30
(1956) ; Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 940-42 (1956).
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